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Abstract 
We examine the industrial organization and institutional development of the asset 
management industry in Asian developing economies – specifically in China, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Thailand. We focus on the size and growth 
of the buy-side of the respective financial markets, asset allocation, the regulatory 
environment, and the state of internationalization of the fund management industry in its 
key components – mutual funds, pension funds and asset management for high net 
worth individuals. We link these the evolution of professional asset management in 
these environments to the development of the respective capital markets and to the 
evolution of corporate governance. We find that the fund management industry 
occupies a very small niche in domestic financial systems that are dominated by banks.  
At the same time, we find that its growth has been very rapid in the early 2000s and we 
suggest that this is likely to persist as the demand for professional management of 
financial wealth in the region develops and as the pension fund sectors of the respective 
economies are liberalized to allow larger portions of assets to be invested in collective 
investment schemes. 
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Few industries have encountered as much ’strategic turbulence’ in recent years 
as has the financial services sector. In response to far-reaching regulatory and 
technological change, together with important shifts in client behavior and the 
globalization of specific financial functions, the organizational structure of the industry 
has been profoundly displaced, and there remains a great deal of uncertainly about the 
nature of any future equilibrium in the industry’s contours.  This applies to financial 
services in general and to asset management – the “buy-side” of the capital markets – 
in particular. Moreover, there is ample evidence to suggest that the development of the 
asset management industry has much to do with the static and dynamic efficiency of 
financial intermediation in national and global financial systems. Asset gathering and 
deployment of savings bear on the rate of capital formation and the growth process in 
general. 
 
This study focuses on the development of the asset management industry in key 
economies of Asia – specifically in China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Philippines and Thailand. We begin with a generic discussion of asset management and 
fiduciary functions in the financial intermediation process, including its institutional and 
industrial organization dimensions. It proceeds to review available information on the 
overall financial market structure and financial infrastructures in East Asian countries as 
they pertain to the asset management industry, and identifies key issues and challenges 
in financial intermediation as they bear on economic growth. To the extent permitted by 
data availability, the paper analyzes the historical growth and current state of the asset 
management industry in selected countries in the region, and identifies key 
impediments to its development. Finally, it considers selected policy measures that may 
help develop the asset management industry in Asia, including establishment of market 
infrastructures and sensible legal and supervisory frameworks. 
 
 
Financial Intermediation Dynamics 
 
The central component of any model of a modern financial system is the nature 
of the conduits through which the financial assets of the ultimate savers flow -through to 
the liabilities of the ultimate users of finance, both within and between national 
economies. [Smith and Walter, 2003] This involves alternative and competing modes of 
financial intermediation, or “contracting”, between counterparties in financial 
transactions. A guide to thinking about financial contracting and the role of financial 
institutions and markets is summarized in Exhibit 1.1 The diagram depicts the financial 
process (flow-of-funds) among the different sectors of the economy in terms of 
underlying environmental and regulatory determinants or drivers as well as the generic 
advantages needed to profit from three primary linkages: 
 
• Fully intermediated financial flows. Savings (the ultimate sources of funds in 
financial systems) may be held in the form of deposits or alternative types of 
                                                 
1 For an early version, see Walter (1988). 
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claims issued by commercial banks, savings organizations, insurance companies 
or other types of financial institutions that finance themselves by placing their 
liabilities directly with the general public. Financial institutions ultimately use 
these funds to purchase assets issued by non-financial entities such as 
households, firms and governments. 
 
• Investment banking and securitized intermediation. Savings may be allocated 
directly or indirectly, via fiduciaries and collective investment vehicles, to the 
purchase of securities publicly issued and sold by various pubic- and private- 
sector organizations in the domestic and international financial markets. 
 
• Direct-connect mechanisms between ultimate borrowers and lenders. Savings 
surpluses may be allocated to borrowers through various kinds of direct-sale 
mechanisms, such as private placements, usually involving fiduciaries as 
intermediaries. 
 
Ultimate users of funds comprise the same three segments of the economy — 
the household or consumer sector, the business sector and the government sector. 
 
• Consumers may finance purchases by means of personal loans from banks or by 
loans secured by purchased assets (hire-purchase or installment loans). These 
may appear on the asset side of the balance sheets of credit institutions for the 
duration of the respective loan contracts on a revolving basis, or they may be 
sold off into the financial market in the form various kinds of securities backed by 
consumer credit receivables. 
 
• Corporations may borrow from banks in the form of unsecured or asset-backed 
straight or revolving credit facilities and/or may sell debt obligations (for example 
commercial paper, receivables financing, fixed-income securities of various 
types) or equities directly into the financial market. 
 
• Governments may likewise borrow from credit institutions (sovereign borrowing) 
or issue securities directly. 
 
Borrowers such as corporations and governments also have the possibility of privately 
issuing and placing their obligations with institutional investors, thereby circumventing 
both credit institutions and the public debt and equity markets.  
 
In the first mode of financial contracting in Exhibit 1, depositors buy the 
“secondary” financial claims or liabilities issued by credit institutions, and benefit from 
liquidity, convenience, and safety through the ability of financial institutions to diversify 
risk and improve credit quality by means of professional management and monitoring of 
their holdings of primary financial claims (both debt and equity). Savers can choose 
from among a set of standardized contracts and receive payments services and 
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interest. 
 
In the second mode of financial intermediation in Exhibit 1, investors can select 
their own portfolios of financial assets directly from among the publicly issued debt and 
equity instruments on offer. This may provide a broader range of options than 
standardized bank contracts, and permit the larger investors to tailor portfolios more 
closely to their objectives while still achieving acceptable liquidity through rapid and 
cheap execution of trades – aided by linkages with banks and other financial institutions 
that are part of the domestic payments mechanism. Investors may also choose to have 
their portfolios professionally managed, for a fee, through various types of mutual funds 
and pension funds – designated in Exhibit 1 as “collective investment vehicles.” 
 
In the third mode of financial intermediation, asset managers in the form of 
institutional investors buy large blocks of privately issued securities. In doing so, they 
often face a liquidity penalty – due to the absence or limited availability of a liquid 
secondary market – for which they are rewarded by a higher yield. On the other hand, 
directly placed securities can be specifically “tailored” to more closely match issuer and 
investor requirements than can publicly issued securities. Market and regulatory 
developments (such as SEC Rule 144A in the US) have added to the liquidity of some 
direct-placement markets. 
 
Value to ultimate savers and investors, inherent in the financial processes 
described here, accrues in the form of a combination of yield, safety and liquidity. Value 
to ultimate users of funds accrues in the form of a combination of financing cost, 
transactions cost, flexibility and liquidity. This value can be enhanced through credit 
backstops, guarantees and derivative instruments such as forward rate agreements, 
caps, collars, futures and options. Furthermore, markets can be linked functionally and 
geographically, both domestically and internationally. Functional linkages permit bank 
receivables, for example, to be repackaged and sold to non-bank securities investors. 
Privately placed securities, once they have been seasoned, may be able to be sold in 
public markets. Geographic linkages make it possible for savers and issuers to gain 
incremental benefits in foreign and offshore markets, thereby enhancing liquidity and 
yield or reducing transaction costs. 
 
 
Shifts in Intermediary Market Shares 
 
Developments over the past several decades in intermediation processes and 
institutional design - both across time and geography - are striking. In the United States 
“commercial banks” (institutions that accept deposits from the pubic and make 
commercial loans) have seen their market share of domestic financial flows between 
end-users of the financial system decline from about 75 per cent in the 1950s to under 
25 per cent today. In Europe the change has been much less dramatic, and the share of 
financial flows running though the balance sheets of banks continues to be well over 60 
per cent– but declining nonetheless. And in Japan as well as much of the rest of Asia, 
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banks continue to control in excess of 70 per cent of financial intermediation flows. Most 
emerging market countries cluster at the highly intermediated end of the spectrum, but 
in many of these economies there is also factual evidence of declining market shares of 
traditional banking intermediaries.  
 
Classic banking functionality, in short, has been in long-term decline more or less 
worldwide. Where has all the money gone? Disintermediation as well as financial 
innovation and expanding global linkages have redirected financial flows through the 
securities markets. Exhibit 2 shows one of the symptoms of this migration at the global 
level, with capital market growth substantially more rapid than world economic growth 
during the period 1990-2004. The assets generated as a result of this disproportionate 
growth must have been the basis for an equally disproportionate growth in the asset 
management industry during this period. 
 
Exhibit 3 decomposes this growth into the principal asset classes for the period 
from 1980 to 2003 and estimated to 2010 – i.e., the global stock of financial assets, 
comprising bank deposits, government debt securities, non-government debt securities 
and equities. The shares of the four components of global financial assets in selected 
regions is depicted in Exhibit 4.This shows the US share of global bank deposits and 
government debt securities declining substantially between 1980 and 2003, while the 
US share of non-government debt securities and equities increased. The European 
share of global bank deposits, equities and private debt securities increased, while all 
asset classes declined in Japan except for government debt securities. China accounts 
for a significant increase in global bank deposits, which is also the case of the rest of 
the world – primarily emerging market countries. 
 
The fact that emerging markets are not immune from financial disintermediation 
can be shown in the example of Mexico. Exhibit 5 depicts the change in the allocation of 
household financial assets in Mexico from the end of 1996 to mid-2005, and 
demonstrates a reduction in saving deposits from 61% to 23% and an increase in 
securities holdings from 7% to 25%, in mutual funds from 7% to 10% and in pension 
investments from 7% to 22% during this period. While total household financial assets 
grew from 2.3 to 4.3 trillion pesos, managed pension and non-pension assets grew from 
9% to 27% of the total. This change in the structure of Mexico’s financial assets 
suggests the importance of pension funds in financial disintermediation alongside a 
strong maturation of the country’s financial system, with improved portfolio allocation 
alternatives for investors and financing alternatives for private sector borrowers.  
 
These shifting patterns of growth in the various asset classes reflect very 
different states of play in the process of financial intermediation in various parts of the 
world. This is made clear in Exhibit 6. Regions with the more highly developed financial 
markets – the US, the UK and the Euro-zone – have the smallest share of bank 
deposits and the largest share of equities and private debt securities as asset classe, 
the reverse of key developing countries. Korea is an exception, with a large private-
sector debt market that stands in contrast to the government-dominated debt markets in 
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most emerging market countries. Exhibit 7 suggests that Asian countries rely 
predominantly on bank financing, which severely limits the volume of securities 
(especially non-government debt obligations) available for investment by asset 
managers. 
 
These data suggest that ultimate savers identified in Exhibit 1 residing in 
advanced financial systems increasingly use the fixed-income and equity markets 
directly and through fiduciaries which, through vastly improved technology, are able to 
provide substantially the same functionality as classic banking relationships – 
immediate access to liquidity, transparency, safety, and so on – coupled to a higher rate 
of return. The one thing they cannot guarantee is settlement at par, which in the case of 
transactions balances (for example money market mutual funds) is mitigated by portfolio 
constraints mandating high-quality, short maturity financial instruments. Ultimate users 
of capital, located on the left side of Exhibit 1, have benefited from enhanced access to 
financial markets across a broad spectrum of maturity and credit quality using 
conventional and structured financial instruments. Although availability and financing 
cost normally depend on the current state of the market, credit and liquidity backstops 
can be easily provided. 
 
At the same time, a broad spectrum of derivatives overlays the markets, making 
it possible to tailor financial products to the needs of end-users with increasing 
granularity, further expanding the availability and reducing the cost of financing on the 
one hand and promoting portfolio optimization on the other. And as the end-users have 
themselves been forced to become more performance-oriented in the presence of much 
greater transparency and competitive pressures, it has become increasingly difficult to 
justify departures from highly disciplined financial behavior on the part of corporations, 
public authorities and institutional investors. 
 
In the process, two additional important and related differences are encountered 
in this generic financial-flow transformation. Intermediation shifts in the first place, from 
book-value to market-value accounting and in the second place from more intensively 
regulated to less intensively regulated channels, generally requiring less oversight and 
less capital for financial institutions and a greater emphasis on financial market 
practices. Both have clear implications for the efficiency properties of financial systems 
and for their transparency, safety and soundness.  
 
 
Contours of the Asset Management Industry: Mutual Funds and Hedge Funds 
 
The institutional asset-management industry is likely to be one of the largest and 
most dynamic parts of the global financial services sector in the years ahead. As of 
2005, the global total of assets under management was estimated at close to $100 
trillion, and expected to grow substantially going forward – see Exhibit 8. 
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 The underlying drivers of the market for institutional asset management are well 
understood. They include the following: 
 
• A continued broad-based trend toward professional management of discretionary 
household assets in the form of mutual funds or unit trusts and other types of 
collective investment vehicles. 
 
• The growing recognition that most government-sponsored pension systems, 
many of which were created wholly or partially on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis, 
have become fundamentally untenable under demographic projections that 
appear virtually certain to materialize, and must be progressively replaced by 
asset pools that will throw-off the kinds of returns necessary to meet the needs of  
growing numbers of longer-living retirees. 
 
• Partial displacement of traditional defined-benefit public- and private-sector 
pension programs backed by assets contributed by employers and working 
individuals under the pressure of the evolving demographics, rising 
administrative costs, and shifts in risk-allocation by a variety of defined-
contribution schemes. 
 
• Substantial increases in individual wealth in a number of developed countries 
and a range of developing countries, as shown by the changing shares in the 
growth of assets under management in Exhibit 8. 
 
• Reallocation of portfolios that have - for regulatory, tax or institutional reasons - 
been overweight domestic financial instruments (notably fixed-income securities) 
toward a greater role for equities and non-domestic asset classes, which not only 
promise higher returns but also may reduce the beneficiaries’ exposure to  risk 
due to portfolio diversification across both asset classes and economic and 
financial environments that are less than perfectly correlated in terms of total 
investment returns. 
 
The growth implied by the first four of these factors, combined with the asset-
allocation shifts implied by the last of the above factors, will tend to drive the dynamics 
and the competitive structure of the global institutional asset management industry in 
the years ahead. The asset management services that are the focus of this paper are 
depicted in Exhibit 9. 
 
 First, retail clients have the option of placing funds directly with financial 
institutions such as banks or by purchasing securities from retail sales forces of broker-
dealers, possibly with the help of fee-based financial advisers. Alternatively, retail 
investors can have their funds professionally managed by buying shares in mutual 
funds or unit trusts (again possibly with the help of advisers), which in turn buy 
securities from the institutional sales desks of broker-dealers (and from time to time 
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maintain balances with banks). 
 
 Second, private clients are broken-out as a separate segment of the asset 
management market in Exhibit 9, and are usually serviced by private bankers who 
bundle asset management with various other services such as tax planning, estates and 
trusts, placing assets directly into financial instruments, commingled managed asset-
pools, or sometimes publicly-available mutual funds and unit trusts. 
 
 Third, foundations, endowments, and financial reserves held by nonfinancial 
companies, institutions and governments can rely on in-house investment expertise to 
purchase securities directly from the institutional sales desks of banks or securities 
broker-dealers, use financial advisers to help them build efficient portfolios, or place 
funds with open-end or closed-end mutual funds. 
 
 Fourth, pension funds take two principal forms, those guaranteeing a level of 
benefits and those aimed at building beneficiary assets from which a pension will be 
drawn (see below). Defined-benefit pension funds can buy securities directly in the 
market, or place funds with banks, trust companies or other types of asset managers, 
often aided by fund consultants who advise pension trustees on performance and asset-
allocation styles. Defined-contribution pension programs may operate in a similar way if 
they are managed in-house, creating proprietary asset pools, and in addition (or 
alternatively) provide participants with the option to purchase shares in publicly-
available mutual funds. 
 
The structure of the asset management industry encompasses significant 
overlaps between the four types of asst pools to the point where they are sometimes 
difficult to distinguish. We have noted the linkage between defined-contribution pension 
funds and the mutual fund industry, and the association of the disproportionate growth 
in the former with the expansion of mutual fund assets under management. There is a 
similar but perhaps more limited linkage between private client assets and mutual funds, 
on the one hand, and pension funds, on the other. This is particularly the case for the 
lower-bound of private client business, which is often commingled with mass-marketed 
mutual funds, and pension benefits awarded to high-income executives, which in effect 
become part of the recipient’s high net-worth portfolio. 
 
Asset management attracts competitors from an extraordinarily broad range of 
strategic groups. Commercial and universal banks, investment banks, trust companies, 
insurance companies, private banks, captive and independent pension fund managers, 
mutual fund companies, financial conglomerates and various types of specialist firms 
are all active in investment management. This rich array of contenders, coming at the 
market from several very different starting-points, competitive resources and strategic 
objectives, is likely to render the market for institutional asset management a highly 
competitive one even under conditions of large size and rapid growth. Securities firms 
(broker-dealers) have also penetrated the mutual fund market, and so have insurance 
companies reacting to stiffer competition for their traditional annuities business. 
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Commercial banks, watching some of their deposit clients drift off into mutual funds, 
have responded by launching mutual fund families of their own, or marketing those of 
other fund managers. Such cross-penetration among strategic groups of financial 
intermediaries, each approaching the business from a different direction, makes mutual 
fund markets highly competitive. 
 
 Competitors in asset management in many markets include domestic and 
foreign-based commercial banks and savings institutions, securities firms (full-service 
investment banks and various kinds of specialists), insurance companies, finance 
companies (including financial subsidiaries of non-financial companies, such as General 
Electric), investment and financial advisers, private banks, and independent mutual fund 
management companies. Members of each strategic group compete with each other, as 
well as with members of other strategic groups. Success or failure depends heavily on 
portfolio management skills and service quality as well as economies of scale, capital 
investment and key technologies.  
 
 Exhibit 10 shows the ownership structure of the asset management industry in 
Europe and the United States, and illustrates the substantial diversity of firms active in 
the industry. Several ownership structures are solely on the “buy-side,” notably stand-
alone and independent asset managers – some of which are either cooperatives or 
closely-held - and those controlled by insurance companies. The remainder are 
controlled either by banks or by financial conglomerates active in both banking and 
insurance. Such asset managers arguably suffer from potential conflicts of interest since 
their parent organization may well be active on the capital-raising or “sell-side” as well, 
and in any case may be subject to intense performance pressure which could turn out to 
be detrimental to the investor clients. 
 
In the following sections we will discuss briefly some of the key generic drivers 
influencing growth and competition in the three principal asset management domains – 
mutual funds, pension funds and fiduciary asset pools managed for high net worth 
clients. 
 
 
Mutual Funds 
 
The mutual fund industry has enjoyed rapid growth in developed countries in 
recent decades, although there are wide differences among national financial markets in 
the pace of development, in the character of the assets under management, and in the 
nature of mutual fund marketing and distribution. Mutual funds essentially take the form 
of collective investment vehicles in which the proceeds from share sales to investors are  
placed in securities of various types. They are usually “mutual” in the sense that the 
investors own all of the assets in the fund, and are responsible for all of its operating 
costs. The funds are usually organized by a particular fund-management company that 
undertakes the legal registration of the fund, nominates a board of directors for the fund, 
and arranges for the distribution and sale of fund shares to the public. The fund’s board 
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of directors contracts with an investment advisor (usually the same fund management 
company) to manage the assets and to handle ongoing operational details such as 
marketing, administration, reporting and compliance. 
 
Legally, mutual funds in the US, for example, take the form of “trusts” comprising  
the undivided sum of assets held on behalf of the investors by the trustees (directors) of 
the fund. US mutual fund assets never belong to either the fund (trust) itself or to the 
management company. Rather, they are owned by the fund investors themselves, who 
can normally redeem their shares instantly at their net asset value (NAV). US mutual 
funds were created as successors to the investment trusts of the 1920s, which suffered 
large  losses during the stock market crash of 1929. The principal legislation governing 
the modern mutual fund industry is the Investment Company Act of 1940, which covers 
both the qualifications and registration of management companies of mutual funds sold 
to the public, as well as the disclosure of pertinent information to investors in the form of 
selling prospectuses and periodic reporting. A mutual fund’s investment advisor must 
comply with terms of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and various state laws. 
Mutual funds in Europe, on the other hand, usually take the form of either “co-
property” (co-ownership) and “company” structures.  A typical example is France, where 
there are two types of mutual funds: Sociétés d'Investissement à Capital Variable 
(SICAVs) and Fonds Communs de Placement (FCPs). SICAVs invest accumulated 
capital subscribed by investors in shares, bonds, short-term paper, or other financial 
instruments. They are independent legal entities, governed by boards, and the investors 
are effectively shareholders who vote at annual shareholder meetings. FCPs consist of 
a “common property” of assets. They are not separate, independent legal entities, but 
rather "co-ownership entities,” i.e., unit trusts which invest in different financial 
instruments - each investor is merely a co-owner of an undivided mass of assets of 
which he or she owns a percentage. 
The SICAV model has been adopted under the EU’s Undertakings for Collective 
Investments in Transferable Securities (UCITS) legislation, which governs how a fund 
can be marketed within the European Union and is designed to allow cross border fund 
sales to investors of different nationalities. Once registered under UCITS, fund shares 
may be sold in any EU country under a “single passport,” subject only to the marketing 
rules of that country. Permissible UCITS investment vehicles include conventional 
equity and fixed-income securities, as well as high-performance "synthetic" funds  
based on futures and options not previously permitted in some  financial centers such 
as London. Under UCITS, 90% of mutual fund assets must be invested in publicly 
traded companies, no more than 5% of the outstanding stock of any company may be 
owned by a fund, and  there are limits on investment funds' borrowing rights. Real 
estate funds, commodity funds and money market funds are specifically excluded from 
UCITS. 
In the United States at the end of 2005 there were more than 8,500 mutual funds 
available to the public, with total assets of about $8 trillion, amounting to about half the 
value of all mutual funds globally. The number of US equity mutual funds were almost 
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three times the 2,800 shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Equity mutual 
funds held 24% of US stock market capitalization and 10% of bond market 
capitalization. Mutual funds accounted for about 21% of US household net financial 
wealth in the early 2000s - more than life insurance companies and about equal to the 
total household deposits in commercial banks. As depicted in Exhibit 11, mutual funds 
were also prominent in various European countries but less so in some of the Asian 
countries, given the aforementioned greater reliance on the banking system for financial 
intermediation. The relative importance of mutual funds in gathering household assets  
in a number of developed countries is shown in Exhibit 11. 
 
Competition for asset-gathering by mutual funds can be among the most Intense 
within financial systems, marked by advertising and extensive media coverage – they 
are in effect mass-market investment vehicles involving “branding” and public 
performance ratings by independent rating agencies. Mutual fund management 
companies have aggressively added banking-type services such as checking and cash-
management accounts, credit cards and overdraft lines. Despite scale economies 
associated with the extraordinary growth in the size mutual funds, costs investors have 
increased over the years. The cost to investors of the average US equity mutual fund, 
for example, rose from 1.10 percent to 1.57 percent of net assets over the twenty years 
ending in 2000.2  Indeed distribution efforts have targeted individual investors to attract 
them away from traditional banking and savings institutions – investors who are not 
particularly sophisticated about the fees, costs, performance metrics and expense 
reimbursement on the part of the fund management companies. 
 
In Europe, mutual fund distribution through bank branches dominates in 
countries such as Germany (80%), France (70%) and Spain (61%), with U.K. 
distribution concentrated among independent advisers and Italian distribution roughly 
split between bank branches and independent sales forces. The dominance of universal 
banks, savings banks and cooperative banks as financial intermediaries in most of the 
continental European countries explains the high concentration of mutual fund 
distribution via branch networks.3 In contrast, 90% of U.S. mutual fund distribution has 
been concentrated in financial intermediaries – notably on full-service broker-dealers 
who maintain large retail sales forces capable of penetrating the household sector and 
which are compensated mainly on the basis of commissions earned and assets under 
management – as well as discount brokers who have compensated for reduced sales 
effort and limited investment advice by charging lower fees and expenses. Insurance 
                                                 
2 John Bogle, John Bogle on Investing, New York, McGraw Hill, 2000, p.163. 
 
     3For example, German mutual fund distribution is dominated by the major banks, with DWS (Deutsche 
Bank) controlling a 24% market share, DIT (Dresdner Bank) 14.1%, and ADIG (Commerzbank and the 
merged HypoVereinsbank) 21.1%. However, foreign players such as Fidelity of the U.S. and Bank Julius 
Baer of Switzerland appear to be making significant inroads even as local competitors strive to improve 
investment performance, increase the range of products available, and enhance their non-European 
(particularly U.S.) funds marketed to German investors. 
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agents account for 15% of U.S. mutual fund distribution, focusing on mutual funds with 
an insurance wrapper such as fixed and variable annuities and guaranteed investment 
contracts (GICs). Bank branches have played growing role in the U.S. after deregulation 
in 1999 although they only account for about 15% distribution share, while direct sales 
by independent find managers have captured about 10% of sales. 
 
 Mutual fund managers offer a broad array of money market, fixed-income and 
equity funds, and invest heavily in technology platforms that enable efficient 
administration, custody and reporting functions in a customer-friendly manner. Some 
fund management companies manage dozens of mutual funds as well as other 
investment vehicles aimed at wealthier clients, such as hedge funds and private equity 
investments. Many if these funds are heavily traded: The median holding period of 
investors in US mutual funds in the 1950s was 6 years while in the 1990s it was 11 
months. The overall equity fund portfolio turnover in the 1950s was 17% per year; in 
2000 it was 108%. Such high portfolio turnover generates problems for long-term 
investors, including higher trading costs, tax inefficiency and lack of interest in 
governance issues among companies whose shares they hold. 
 
 The basis of competition in mutual fund management comprises five elements – 
perceived performance, fees for performance, expenses, direct and indirect costs of 
marketing and distribution, and service quality and technology. The basic competitive 
variables are as follows:  
 
• Investors must select from an array of investment types or styles based on asset 
classes (stocks, bonds, etc.). Fund managers are expected to remain true to their 
proclaimed investment objectives and attempt to optimize asset allocation in 
accordance with modern portfolio management concepts. 
 
• Mutual fund managers incur a variety of operating costs and expenses in running 
their businesses, notably for personnel and facilities, commissions, and  
technology. The fund management company retained by the fund board enters 
into a contract for services in which it charges a fee for managing the assets, and 
its expenses, in part, are reimbursed. Combined, these fees are charged against 
the assets of the fund and comprise the fund’s “expense ratio.” Fund investors 
may also be subject to a sales charge when they invest (a “front-end load”), or at 
a later point when they exit (a “back-end load”), as well as a charge for marketing 
the fund to its investors. Funds generally subject investors to higher expense 
ratios when the fund size is smaller, the turnover is higher, or when the relative 
fund performance is better. 
 
• Service quality in fund management involves ease of investment and 
redemptions, the quality and transparency of statements, cash management, tax 
computation and investment advice. 
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• Mutual fund management companies tend to invest heavily in IT platforms in 
order to improve service quality and cut costs, investments that must be paid-for 
in the form of fees and expenses reimbursed by the funds.  
 
One of the key issues relating to the mutual fund industry is assessing 
performance. Do fund managers, after expenses and fees, outperform available 
index funds or exchange-traded funds that reflect gains and losses of the market 
as a whole? Issues that need to be taken into account to address this question 
include the following: 
 
• Time buckets (length, start/end periods) used for performance tracking. 
 
• Index benchmark (e.g., S&P 500 vs. Russell 2000) against which performance is 
measured. 
 
• Survivorship bias (upward bias in the performance of surviving managed funds 
as poor performers fail and no longer appear in the data). 
 
• Sharpe ratio (performance adjusted for risk). 
 
• Management fees. 
 
• Front loads, back loads, digressive loads in annual return-equivalents. 
 
• Fees and other charges – such as US 12b(1) fees – which regulators permit to 
be loaded onto fund investors. 
 
• Performance distribution over market cycles. 
 
• Performance distribution relative to sector means. 
 
• The importance of fund names as reflecting investment styles, and the problem 
of style-drift. 
 
• Persistence – do firms outperforming in one period continue to outperform in 
successive periods? 
 
 Confidence in mutual funds as transparent, efficient and fair investment vehicles 
was undermined with the uncovering of major scandals in 2003 and 2004, involving 
“late trading” and “market timing” in the shares of mutual funds with the knowledge and 
sometimes participation of the fund managers. The disclosures, legal proceedings and 
settlements led to extensive further investigations of mutual fund practices and 
governance procedures. 
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 Late trading allows a favored investor to illegally execute trades at the fund’s 4 
pm US daily closing net asset value (NAV) sometimes as late as 9 pm the same 
evening, enabling the investor to “bet on yesterday’s horse race” by profiting from news 
released domestically after the closing or released overseas in different time zones. 
Ordinary fund investors are obliged to trade at the 4 pm price until it is reset at 4 pm the 
following day. The practice, in effect, transfers wealth from ordinary shareholders to 
sophisticated hedge fund investors who had agreed invest “sticky assets” in lucrative 
(i.e., incorporating high performance fees for the fund manager) hedge funds to be sold 
to sophisticated buyers. For a fund management group to allow late trading is a major 
regulatory violation and a serious breach of fiduciary duty owed to the group’s investors. 
One study has suggested that late trading cost investors about $400 million per year 
between 2001 and 2004, or .005% in annual returns for international mutual funds and 
0.006% for domestic funds.4 
 
 Market timing trades in mutual fund shares - a practice not in itself illegal - 
involves rapid-fire trading by favored investors in shares primarily of international mutual 
funds across time-zones. This practice skims the returns from the mutual fund 
shareholders, increases mutual fund expenses and requires them to hold large cash 
balances to meet abrupt withdrawals, costs which have to be borne by all investors, not 
just the market-timers.  Investors permitted to engage in market-timing trades by fund 
managers again promised to park “sticky” assets with the fund management companies 
in their own hedge funds, in effect kicking-back some of their questionable market-
timing gains to the fund management companies, not to the shareholders of the mutual 
fund. Market timing trades were estimated to have cost long-term US mutual fund 
investors about $4 billion of dilution per year in the early 2000s.5  
 
 By July 2005 prosecutors in the US had extracted over $2.8 billion in fines and 
penalties from some 24 mutual fund management companies in settlements in which 
those charged admitted no guilt. The funds managed by the investment groups that 
were named in the scandals suffered considerably more redemptions than firms that 
were not charged, including the industry’s largest fund managers. Some observers 
argued that profit-making mutual fund managers' earnings are a function of the volume 
of assets under management, and so there is relentless pressure to grow those assets 
by offering an increasing variety of fund products to investors who benefit from their 
performance, liquidity and originality. Such pressure can cause fiduciary violations in all 
but mutually-owned fund managers and index funds, and perhaps should be seen as an 
unwelcome but tolerable friction to be endured in an industry that has benefited millions 
of people otherwise unable to invest safely in financial markets. In any event, the late 
trading and market timing scandals were not seen to cause enough damage to seriously 
                                                 
4 Eric Zitzewitx, “How Widespread is Late Trading in Mutual Funds?,” Stanford Business School Research 
Paper, Sept. 2003. 
 
5 Eric Zitzewitz, “Who Cares About Shareholders? Arbitrage Proofing Mutual Funds,” Stanford Business 
School Research Paper, March 2002. 
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impair  mutual funds as investment vehicles, but they did raise serious questions among 
regulators, policy advocates and prosecutors regarding conflicting interests between 
mutual fund investors and the fund management companies that invest the assets.6 
 
• Fund managers want independent directors who comply with the rules but are 
cooperative, supportive and not difficult to work with. Investors want directors 
who will robustly execute their fiduciary duties to the mutual fund shareholders. 
 
• Fund managers want maximum fees and expense reimbursements. Investors 
want their fund directors to negotiate minimum total costs and for those costs to 
be fully disclosed. 
 
• Fund managers want to ensure that they are reappointed. Investors want boards 
that act vigorously in their interests in selecting managers capable of top-flight 
risk-adjusted performance. 
 
• Fund managers want to increase assets under management. Investors want 
optimum investment returns, after expenses and taxes. 
 
• Fund managers want to promote their funds through brokers and financial 
advisers who need to be compensated. Investors do not want to pay these fees if 
they receive no benefits from them. 
 
• Fund managers want to lower unreimbursed costs through soft dollar 
commissions from broker-dealers. Investors want best-price execution of trades 
and lowest commissions. 
 
• Fund managers want to favor their own funds by obtaining “shelf space” in 
distribution channels, while investors want access through brokers to the best 
and most appropriate funds for them. 
 
• Fund managers want to be able organize funds to assist other business interests 
of the firm, such as investment banking, and promoting investments in particular 
stocks. Investors want all investment decisions by the managers to be arm’s-
length and objective.7 
 
 These are generic conflicts of interest with which the mutual fund industry will 
have to come to terms if it expects to be an enduring part of the financial architecture. 
Containing exploitation of these conflicts will invariably depend on a combination of 
market discipline and effective regulation. Failure in either domain will drive assets onto 
the balance sheets of banks and into alternative investment vehicles. 
                                                 
6 For a detailed discussion of the issues, see Roy C. Smith and Ingo Walter, Governing the Modern 
Corporation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
7 Tom Lauticella, “US’s SEC Asks Courts to Tighten Disclosure Edicts,” Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2004. 
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Mutual fund regulation in advanced financial markets require strict fit-and-proper 
criteria for management companies, as well as extensive disclosure of pertinent 
information. In the US the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 makes 
the Securities and Exchange Commission responsible for overseeing investment 
advisers with over $25 million under management, with state regulators alone 
responsible for investment advisers with smaller amounts under management advisers 
who had previously been co-regulated together with the SEC. The large investment 
advisers falling under SEC jurisdiction account for about 95% of U.S. assets under 
management, although the vast majority of abusive practices and enforcement 
problems occur among the smaller firms.8  
 
A great deal of mutual fund information is in the public domain, which helps 
market discipline along with the aforementioned high degree of transparency with 
respect to fund performance and ample media coverage and vigorous competition 
among funds and fund managers. This means that investors today face a generally fair 
and efficient market in which to make their asset choices. Overall, the mutual fund 
business, at least in the more developed markets, is probably a good example of how 
regulation and competition can come together to serve the retail investor about as well 
as is possible. 
 
                                                 
     8 Sana Siwolop, ARegulating Financial Advisers: Are the States Up To It?@ The New York Times, 
June 29, 1997. 
In contrast to the US, EU rules governing the operation and distribution of mutual 
funds have traditionally been highly fragmented. As of the 1990s, definitions of mutual 
funds varied from country to country, as did legal status and regulatory provisions. 
Door-to-door selling was forbidden in Belgium and Luxemburg, for example, and strictly 
regulated in Germany. In Britain, on the other hand, direct marketing was the norm. 
Market access to clients varied between the extremes of high levels of impenetrability to 
virtually complete openness. Stimulated by the UCITS initiative, discussed earlier, there 
is evidence that mutual fund regulation is gradually converging in the EU. 
 
Not unexpectedly, the mutual fund management industry worldwide has seen a 
host of strategic initiatives among fund managers. These include mergers, acquisitions 
and alliances among fund managers as well as between fund managers and 
commercial and universal banks, securities broker-dealers, and insurance companies. 
In general the effect of competition in the industry has been to make it more customer-
friendly, technology-sensitive, adaptive - and more concentrated. However, at least in 
the United States there has been little evidence of increasing market-concentration in 
the mutual fund industry over the years. 
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 In 2005 the US mutual funds industry had a five-firm ratio of 39%, a ten-firm ratio 
of 51% and a 25 firm ratio of 74% - these ratios were roughly constant for the previous 
15 years.9 Factors that seem to argue for greater industry concentration in the future are 
economies of scale and band-name recognition. Arguments against further 
concentration include shifts in performance track-records and the role of mutual fund 
supermarkets in distribution, which increase the relative marketing advantage of smaller 
funds. One factor that may promote continued fragmentation of the mutual fund industry 
is that size itself can lead to significant performance problems. 
 
 
Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds 
 
 Hedge funds gained substantial prominence as investment vehicles in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. At the end of 2004 there were estimated to be about 8,300 
active hedge funds in existence worldwide, with assets under management approaching 
$1 trillion and  growing at about 20% per year – see Exhibit 12. 
 
 Hedge funds are lightly regulated investment vehicles – essentially closed-end 
investment pools with participations sold to wealthy individuals and institutional 
investors such as foundations, endowments and pension funds. Hedge funds originally 
sought to “hedge” the underlying risk of the market using various strategies designed to 
identify underpriced assets and overpriced assets, taking both long and short positions 
in order to remain essentially neutral with respect to overall market risk. Various types of 
derivatives and leverage were used to neutralize market risk and increase the size of 
positions in order to benefit from often very small pricing imperfections. Consequently, 
performance of many hedge fund strategies, particularly relative value strategies, was 
not dependent on the direction of the bond or equity markets -- unlike conventional 
equities or mutual funds, which are generally “long only” and fully exposed to market 
risk. 
 
As the industry developed the classic hedging strategies evolved into a broad array of 
investment styles, so that hedge funds today are probably best described as “special-
purpose investment vehicles” which may or may not hedge their various exposures. 
Some strategies which try to be uncorrelated to equity markets are intended to deliver 
consistent returns with extremely low risk of loss, while others may be as or more 
volatile than mutual funds. Many, but not all, hedge fund strategies tend to hedge 
against downturns in the markets being traded. Most are flexible in their investment 
options and may use short selling, leverage, derivatives such as puts, calls, options and  
futures. The following are the principal investment styles that appear in the global hedge 
fund market today:10 
• Aggressive Growth: Invests in equities expected to experience acceleration in 
growth of earnings per share. 
                                                 
9 Investment Company Institute, Investment Industry Factbook, 2005 (Washington, D.C.: ICI, 2005). 
10 Source: Hedge Fund  Association at http://www.thehfa.org/Aboutus.cfm 
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• Distressed Securities: Buys equity, debt, or trade claims at deep discounts of 
companies in or facing bankruptcy or reorganization. 
• Emerging Markets: Invests in equity or debt of emerging (less mature) markets 
which tend to have higher inflation and volatile growth. 
• Fund of Funds: Mixes and matches hedge funds and other pooled investment 
vehicles. This blending of different strategies and asset classes aims to provide a 
more stable long-term investment return than any of the individual funds. 
• Income: Invests with primary focus on yield or current income rather than solely 
on capital gains. May utilize leverage to buy bonds and sometimes fixed income 
derivatives in order to profit from principal appreciation and interest income 
• Macro: Aims to profit from changes in global economies, typically brought about 
by shifts in government policy which impact interest rates, in turn affecting 
currency, stock, and bond markets. 
• Market Neutral - Arbitrage: Attempts to hedge out most market risk by taking 
offsetting positions, often in different securities of the same issuer. 
• Market Neutral - Securities Hedging: Invests equally in long and short equity 
portfolios generally in the same sectors of the market. 
• Market Timing: Allocates assets among different asset classes depending on the 
manager’s view of the economic or market outlook. 
• Opportunistic: Investment theme changes from strategy to strategy as 
opportunities arise to profit from events such as IPOs, sudden price changes 
often caused by an 
• Multi Strategy: Investment approach is diversified by employing various 
strategies simultaneously to realize short- and long-term gains. 
• Short Selling: Sells securities short in anticipation of being able to re-buy them at 
a future date at a lower price due to the manager’s assessment of the 
overvaluation of the securities, or the market, or in anticipation of earnings 
disappointments often due to accounting irregularities, new competition, change 
of management, etc. 
• Special Situations: Invests in event-driven situations such as mergers, hostile 
takeovers, reorganizations, or leveraged buy outs. 
• Value: Invests in securities perceived to be selling at deep discounts to their 
intrinsic or potential worth. 
Most hedge funds are highly specialized, relying on the specific expertise of the 
manager or management team. Consequently, hedge fund managers’ remuneration is 
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heavily weighted towards performance incentives (20% or more of investment gains), in 
an effort to attract the best fund management talent. However, hedge fund expense 
ratios are also high – up to 2% of assets under management - so that hedge fund 
managers can do very well regardless of performance. Lock-ups usually prevent 
investors from withdrawing their funds for various periods of time, in order to allow 
hedge fund managers to execute their strategies. At the same time, since size can be 
the enemy of hedge fund performance, many successful hedge fund managers limit the 
amount of capital they will accept. 
Private equity funds probably originated in the late 18th Century, when 
entrepreneurs in Europe and the US found wealthy individuals to back their projects on 
an ad hoc basis. This informal method of financing became an industry in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s when a number of private equity firms were founded. Private equity is 
now a recognized asset class. 11 
In contrast to hedge funds, private equity is a broad term that refers to any type of 
equity investment in an asset in which the equity is not freely tradable on a public stock 
market. Categories of private equity investment include leveraged buyouts, venture 
capital, growth capital, angel investing, mezzanine capital and others. Private equities 
are equity securities of companies that have not “gone public” (companies that have not 
listed their stock on a public exchange), and are  generally illiquid and considered a 
long-term investment.  Private equity usually includes forms of venture capital and 
management buyout (MBO) financing – i.e., both early stage (venture) and later stage 
(buyout) investing.  In some cases the term “private equity” is used to refer only to the 
buy-out and buy-in investment sector. In other cases – for example in Europe but not 
the US - the term “venture capital” is used to cover all stages, i.e. synonymous with 
“private equity.” In the US “venture capital” refers only to investments in early-stage and 
expanding companies. 
Private equity investing reached a peak during the technology bubble of the late 
1990s and subsequently focused more on  investment opportunities where the business 
has proven potential for realistic growth in an expanding market, backed by a well-
researched and documented business plan and an experienced management team – 
ideally including individuals who have started and run a successful business before. 
Private equity firms are especially active in restructuring situations, where shifts in 
technologies, international comparative advantage, overcapacity, bankruptcies and 
government policy changes have made existing businesses economically non-viable.  
This includes privatizations and strategic divestitures by major corporations and 
conglomerates, with substantial activity in this respect in countries like Germany, Japan 
and China. In this activity, private equity firms – which consider their core competence 
to be in industrial and financial expertise and relatively long investment periods – have 
had to compete with hedge funds looking for pure financial plays.  
                                                 
11 British Venture Capital Association at http://www.bvca.co.uk/publications/guide/intro.html. 
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In the following section, we review the collective investment funds in China, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Thailand.  The rest of the Asian 
economies either have no investment fund industries, or are at the very initial stages of 
development.  We describe the current status of the fund industry in Asia focusing on 
size and growth of the industry, asset allocation of funds, regulatory environment 
surrounding the fund industry and the state of internationalization of the fund 
management industry in these countries. 
 
History of Collective Investment Schemes in Asia  
The collective investment funds in the countries that are the subject of this study 
were established as early as 1950s, but most did not begin to grow until the mid-1990s.   
 
In the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) the first mutual fund was introduced in 
1991, when local governments established two closed-end funds with total assets of 
Rmb 90 million.  The first mutual fund listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange began 
trading in 1993.  In 2001 Hua’an Fund Management Company became the first Chinese 
asset manager to establish an open-end fund, and the number of open-end funds 
reached 142 in May 2005.  By 2005 the number of open-end funds exceeded the 
number of closed-end funds (54 as of May 2005) in terms of assets under management 
and captured more than 70 percent of the mutual funds sector by value.  
 
In Korea, collective investment schemes consist of investment trust companies 
(ITCs), securities investment companies (SICs), and trust accounts of banks.  ITCs and 
bank trust accounts handle contractual type products whereby investors purchase 
beneficiary certificates.  SICs, on the other hand, handle corporate-type products 
whereby investors purchase stocks of closed-end funds.  The Securities Investment 
Trust Business Act was proulgated in 1969, and the first contractual-type Korean equity 
investment trust was introduced in 1970.  In the summer of 1996, as part of Korean 
financial market reforms, investment trust companies were liberalized and the 
restrictions on their establishment were lifted. The number of domestic fund 
management companies reached 31 before the onset of the Asian financial crisis in late 
1997. Thereafter the fund management industry shrank in size, but began recovering 
after 2000 with the implementation of improved operations and systems including mark-
to-market valuations, better internal control standards, external audit of trusts assets 
and other reforms. At the end of 2004, the number of funds reached 45, including 11 
companies with foreign shareholdings of over 50 percent.  Corporate-type investment 
funds (Securities Investment Companies) were introduced in 1998 and are usually 
referred to as “mutual funds.”  At first, only closed-end funds were allowed, sales of 
open-end type mutual funds were permitted as from January 2001.   
 
The first unit trust in Malaysia was established in 1959 by the Malayan Unit Trust 
Ltd.  The Malaysian Government actively encouraged and sponsored the establishment 
of new funds during the initial years, and between 1959 and1976 18 new funds were 
established.  Unit trust management companies, in the form of subsidiaries of financial 
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institutions, came into existence in 1980s, and investor interest in unit trusts increased 
substantially through active marketing and distribution via banks’ branch networks.  The 
period from 1991 to 1996 marked a rapid growth of the unit trust industry in terms of the 
number of new management companies established, as well as assets under 
management. Unit trusts thus emerged as a key household savings product in 
Malaysia. The main types of mutual funds in Malaysia are equity unit trusts, property 
trusts, Islamic unit trusts, diversified unit trusts and specialty unit trusts, depending on 
the types of assets held.  
 
Singapore hosts the most developed collective investment industry in the region.   
With more than 70 percent of total AUM sourced from abroad, Singapore is an 
international asset management center.  Over 46 percent of total funds under 
management were sourced from the Asia-Pacific countries as of 2004.   
 
The first mutual fund in Thailand was introduced in 1977.  Until 1992, the Thai 
mutual fund industry was controlled by a single company (Mutual Fund Company), 
which was an affiliate of the government-owned Industrial Finance Corporation of 
Thailand.  In 1992, the mutual fund industry was liberalized, triggering a rapid increase 
in the number of mutual funds. Both closed-end and open-end funds are available in 
Thailand, although there are many more open-end than closed-end funds.  
 
 
Size of Collective Investment Schemes in Asia  
The mutual fund industry in Asia remains small when compared to highly 
developed financial markets such as the US and Europe.  As of end-2004, the net 
assets of the fund industry in the eight countries under review amounted to US$1,184 
billion, compared to a total of US$8,792 bn in the Americas and US$5,628 bn in 
Europe12.   There are considerable differences in relative sizes of the industry across 
individual countries in Asia.  The three largest fund management industries in the region 
are Japan (US$548.8 bn), Singapore (US$349.2 bn) and Korea (US$ 180.7 bn).  China, 
Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia have very small managed fund markets, totaling to 
US$39.2 bn, US$ 30.0 bn, US$ 24.0 bn and US$ 11.1 bn respectively. In the rest of the 
countries in Asia – which we do not cover in this study - the mutual fund industry is 
either negligible or non-existent. 
 
In China, there were 54 closed-end and 142 open-end mutual funds in operation 
at end-May 2005, managed by 40 fund-management companies, which accounted for 
over Rmb 379 billion in assets under management.  Mutual funds remain a very small 
part of the Chinese financial system - funds under management at the end of 2005 
amounted to only about 1% of the assets of the country’s banking system. 
 
                                                 
12 Source: Investment Company Institute and Korea Institute of Finance. 
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In Indonesia, 47 investment managers operated 186 funds (Capital Market 
Supervisory Agency; Bapepam) and total assets managed by investment funds 
amounted to Rp 69.48 trillion at the end of 2003.  
 
Total net asset value of investment trusts was RM 87.39 billion at the end of 
2004 in Malaysia -- RM 80.63 billion comprised conventional unit trust funds and the 
remaining RM 6.76 billion were Islamic-based funds (Exhibit 13). The funds are invested 
heavily in equities.  As of end-2004, 65.8 percent of the funds were invested in equities, 
11 percent in fixed income securities and 19.5 percent is held in cash (See Exhibit 14).   
 
The Philippine mutual fund industry is the smallest and most underdeveloped in 
the region among the countries covered.  As of August 2005, there were 34 investment 
companies in the Philippines — 33 open-end mutual funds and one closed-end fund – 
total assets of the fund management industry stood at P 29.4 billion. Less than 2% of 
the funds invested in the Philippine Stock Exchange were channeled through mutual 
funds in 2005. 
 
Pension funds and mutual funds overlap in the Singaporean financial system, 
and it is difficult to disentangle data for collective investment schemes (unit trusts).  
According to Monetary Authority of Singapore, total unit-trust assets amounted to 
S$19.8bn as of end-2004, comprising 379 unit trusts in the country.  Assets under 
management for the funds approved by the Central Provident Fund Investment Scheme 
amounted to S$14.2 billion in 2004, constituting about 72 percent of the total AUM by 
the fund management industry.   
 
In Thailand, there were 506 registered mutual funds, including 23 closed-end and 
375 open-end funds as of end-November 2004 (Exhibit 15).  These funds were 
managed by 16 licensed fund-management companies, which had a combined Tbt 
664.9 billion in assets under management.    
 
As these observations suggest, the mutual fund industry remains small in Asia.  
In addition to being limited in size, the industry occupies a minor niche in most domestic 
financial systems dominated by banks in the region.  For example, total assets of 
mutual funds amount to only one percent of the assets of the banking system in China.   
Mutual funds made up just 12.9 percent of the total market capitalization of Bursa 
Malaysia at end-July 2005.  The percentage of household assets invested in mutual 
funds amount to only 3 percent on Japan, 4 percent in Korea.  For comparison, the ratio 
is 21 percent for U.S. household assets and 13 percent for European household assets. 
 
 
Asset Allocation in Asian Investment Funds  
 
The mutual fund industry in Asia generally suffers from a lack of available local 
debt and equity instruments in which to invest, restrictions on asset allocation and 
foreign portfolio investments and is some cases limited liquidity of the available assets.   
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In China, the regulations dictate that no more than 10 percent of a mutual fund 
can be invested in any one company, and no more than 10 percent of a company’s 
shares can be held by any one mutual fund.  Moreover, 80 percent of assets held by 
mutual funds must be invested in the equity and bond markets, and at least 20 percent 
must be invested in Treasury bonds.  As of 2004, 57.3 percent of mutual fund assets 
were invested in equity funds and 26 percent were invested in the money market 
instruments. 
 
In Indonesia, funds are classified into fixed income funds, money market funds, 
discretionary funds and equity funds.  However, Indonesian investment-fund assets are 
predominantly placed in fixed-income investments (public-sector bonds and money-
market funds).  The share of equity funds is only 1.8 percent of all fund assets.  The 
2005 mutual fund crisis in Indonesia presented a good case study of the dangers of 
insufficient diversification and heavy reliance on fixed income securities.  
 
In Korea, investment trust companies are classified into stock-type (required to 
hold at least 60 percent of assets in stocks), bond-type (at least 60 percent must be 
invested in bonds) and mixed-type or “blended” investment funds.  In addition, there are 
money market funds that invest mainly in commercial paper and short-term government 
bonds and monetary stabilization bonds.  Exhibit 16 provides the breakdown of 
investments as provided by the Korea Investment Trust Companies Association.  The 
funds are invested heavily in the money market and bond market.  As of 2004, 40.8 
percent of funds under management were held in bonds and 32.2 percent were held in 
the money market.  
 
In Malaysia, fund management companies rely heavily on equities for their asset 
allocation strategies, with 65.8 percent of assets allocated to equity investments.  
Malaysia is the country with greatest share of funds invested in equities (Exhibit 14).  
 
In Singapore, unit trusts are likewise heavily invested in the equity markets.  The 
share of equities is 44.4 percent, the share of bonds is 22.1 percent and the share of 
money market instruments is 16.5 percent as of end-2004.  From negligible levels in 
2000, alternative investments, commodities, derivatives and foreign exchange products 
accounted for 11 percent of total AUM at end-2004  (Exhibit 17). 
 
 To summarize, although different classes of mutual funds are available in the 
Asian countries (equity-funds, bond-funds and mixed funds), significant proportion of 
mutual funds’ assets are invested in short-term money market instruments and 
government bonds in most of the countries in the region with the exception of China, 
Malaysia and Singapore, where investments in equities dominate (Exhibit 18).  Still, 
even countries where a significant share of funds are invested in equities suffer from 
limits on portfolio diversification - mainly due to lack of investable securities, the 
requirements set by regulators on the composition of funds, and restrictions on offshore 
investments. 
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Regulation of the Investment Fund Industry in Asia  
 
Regulatory authorities in Asia have made a serious effort to promulgate 
legislation and regulation to support a properly structured mutual fund industry – one 
that will strengthen efficiency in financial intermediation. All countries in this study 
except Indonesia, have reorganized their regulatory systems covering the fund 
management industry in the form of independent and centralized systems, incorporating 
different regulatory regimes and functions that had previously been spread over various 
agencies such as ministries of finance and central banks. Indonesia is in the process of 
centralizing and has established a committee for the integration of the regulatory units. 
This transition is in line with the regulatory trend in more mature financial markets -- for 
example, the UK's Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 (FSMA) and Japan's Act 
of Investment Trust and Investment Corporation, which were promulgated based on the 
principle of regulation by function.  The Asian countries have also completed enacting 
laws that significantly liberalized the fund management industry and revised 
establishment criteria. 
 
The mutual-fund industry in China was largely unregulated until 1997, when the 
Investment Fund Law was passed.  The Securities Investment Fund Law superseded 
that legislation in June 2004 and set requirements for the establishment and trading of 
the funds.  The main requirements for establishing a fund are that it maintain a minimum 
registered capital of Rmb 100 million and that the major shareholder in the fund must be 
a company specialized in the securities business, with no record of regulatory 
infringements over the previous three years and with capital of at least Rmb 300 million.  
Funds must designate a custodian in the form of a commercial bank approved by the 
CSRC, whose tasks include safekeeping of fund assets, establishing accounts, 
maintaining records and handling settlement and delivery.  In February 2005, the 
People's Bank of China, China Banking Regulatory Commission and China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) jointly issued the Administrative Rules for Pilot 
Incorporation of Fund Management Companies by Commercial Banks. The rules seek 
to ensure segregation of commercial banks’ banking business and their fund-
management business.  The China Banking Regulatory Commission oversees the asset 
management companies, the international trust and investment companies, and the 
banks’ factoring activities.  The China Securities Regulatory Commission supervises the 
mutual funds and also the emerging share investment activities of the national pension 
fund. 
 
As noted, in Indonesia regulation of the mutual fund industry has not yet been 
centralized and there is no unitary regulatory framework.  The Central Bank, Ministry of 
Finance and Capital Market Supervisory Agency (Bapepam) share responsibility for 
regulation.   
 
In Korea, The Indirect Investment Asset Management Business Act was enacted 
in October 2003 and came into force in January 2004 for the regulation of the asset 
management industry.  Previously, the contractual-type funds had been regulated by 
 
 25
the Securities Investment Trust Business Act, corporate-type funds by the Securities 
Investment Company Act, unspecified money trusts by the Trust Business Act, and 
variable insurance products by the Insurance Business Act. The 2003 Act was based on 
the Securities Investment Trust Business Act and provides that the full range of asset 
management activities be regulated equally by unifying all asset management-related 
regulations. The new Act widened the scope of investible assets to include exchange-
traded derivatives, OTC derivatives, real estate, real assets, and similar products.  The 
Act also established regulations covering management of fund assets.  Investment by 
any one indirect investment vehicle in investment securities of the same issuer can not 
exceed 10 percent of total assets, an asset management company can not invest in 
more than 20 percent of the outstanding shares of a company, comprising the 
cumulative exposure of all of its direct and its indirect investment vehicles.  Also, asset 
management companies are required to publish investment prospectuses and quarterly 
performance reports, and must report to the FSC on a monthly basis.13 
 
In Malaysia, the regulation of the investment fund industry was centralized with 
the establishment of the Securities Commission (SC) in March 1993, coupled with the 
implementation of the Securities Commission Regulations in1996.  The Securities 
commission adopted a full disclosure-based regulatory framework in May 2003, and 
accelerated the assessment of applications for the issuance of unit trusts and 
prospectus registration, and reinforced disclosure and reporting requirements.  The 
regulations also allow third-party distribution and the licensing of tied agents involved in 
the distribution of unit trusts, and allowed stock brokerage companies to manage unit 
trusts. These changes provided substantial impetus to growth and development in the 
industry.  The Malaysian Capital Market Master Plan serves as a guideline for the 
financial sector through 2010, and encourages the continued liberalization of mutual 
funds that began in 1997.  The Federation of Malaysian Unit Trust Managers seeks to 
develop the industry by improving the regulatory and legal environment for unit trusts 
with a view to formulating business policies beneficial to the industry, providing 
information and assistance to its members, and promoting awareness of the industry 
among the general public. 
 
 Mutual-fund activities in the Philippines are regulated by the SEC under the 
Investment Company Act.  Investment companies are required to have a minimum 
subscribed and paid-up capital of P 50 million, and to submit their investment objectives 
and plans to the SEC for approval.  
 
In Singapore, The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has been responsible 
for regulation of mutual funds since 1999.  MAS introduced the Business Trusts Act to 
regulate the trust business, which was passed by Parliament in September 2004 and 
came into effect in January 2005.   
                                                 
13 See http://www.amak.or.kr/Eng/Investment/InDisclosure.aspx for additional information. On fund 
taxation in Korea, see http://www.amak.or.kr/Eng/Investment/InTaxation.aspx. 
 
 26
Securities and Exchange Commission regulates the unit trust industry in 
Thailand.  Since August 2003 all financial institutions are allowed to apply for mutual-
fund management licenses, although only through separate entities in which they own 
at least 75 percent. In February 2005 the SEC and the Association of Investment 
Management Companies (AIMC) proposed additional risk disclosures for mutual funds 
operating in Thailand.   
 
Principal regulatory restrictions in the fund management industry in the region 
can be summarized as entry criteria such as minimum capital requirements, minimum 
number of investors to establish the fund, number of years of experience as a fund 
manager and limits on asset allocation.  However, the specifics of the regulations vary 
to a great extent among countries.  For example, the minimum capital requirement for 
an asset management company is US$ 12 mn in China, US$ 1 mn in Korea.   
 
 
Internationalization of the Mutual Fund Industry in Asia  
 
The asset management industry in Asia is opening to global financial markets, 
but restrictions on foreign capital as well as overseas investment of funds remain. The 
domestic funds in the region face restrictions to invest in offshore markets, which 
severely restricts competition in the fund management industry as well as opportunities 
for portfolio diversification. Exhibit 19 summarizes the current state of restrictions on the 
international operations of funds.   
 
In China, the first joint-venture fund was established in 1991 and more than 50 
foreign-related mutual funds had been set up by 1995,  traded both within and outside 
the PRC.  Besides forming joint ventures, foreign fund management companies have 
begun to enter the Chinese market by buying shares in local fund managers.  Foreign 
companies are allowed to take stakes of up to 49 percent in local fund managers, a 
ceiling that is scheduled to rise to 51 percent by 2007. The foreign fund-management 
partner in any Sino-foreign joint venture must have a paid-up capital of at east Rmb 300 
million.  Investment in foreign assets remain restrictive in China.  In 2003, the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) established new rules for overseas 
investments by the local fund management companies, requiring them to seek 
permission before setting up special foreign exchange capital accounts through which 
overseas investment funds must be channeled. 
 
In order to attract foreign capital, Korea abolished all restrictions on foreign 
investment in stocks and bonds in 1998.  Foreign fund management companies can 
enter the local fund management industry by establishing a branch, subsidiary or joint 
venture, or by taking over existing holdings in an asset management firm.  In order to 
set up a local branch, the foreign firm must have sufficient experience in the fund 
management industry and meet international criteria for asset allocation and operations.  
For a foreign asset management firm to be active in the Korean mutual fund industry, 
the four key criteria are that:  1) It must already have been in the asset management 
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business abroad; 2) Its assets under management must exceed W 5 trillion; 3) Is credit 
rating must be investment-grade; and 4) It must not have been subject to criminal or 
administrative sanction in its home country. 
 
In Malaysia, the Securities Commission planned to open the sector to foreign 
companies from July 2003, but postponed the liberalization to give domestic companies 
more time to strengthen their operations before facing foreign competitors. From April 
2005 Bank Negara Malaysia allowed mutual funds to raise foreign investments up to 30 
percent of funds under management.  Mutual-fund managers investing abroad are 
required to seek the Securities Commission’s prior approval regarding the foreign 
exchanges in which they intend to invest. 
 
In Indonesia, Bapepam issued a ruling in August 2002 allowing mutual funds to 
buy offshore securities (public offerings abroad and securities listed on foreign 
exchanges), as long as information on the securities can be accessed via the mass 
media or the Internet and total purchases do not exceed 15 percent of net asset. 
 
In the Philippines, the proposed legislation, the Revised Investment Company 
Act, aims to diversify the investor base by eliminating restrictions on foreign ownership 
of investment companies.  The bill also proposes to allow foreign mutual funds to sell 
securities in the Philippines, provided that a portion of funds raised from any public offer 
is invested domestically.  In February 2001, in response to prolonged weakness in the 
local equities market, the SEC allowed Philippine-registered mutual funds to invest 20 
percent of their portfolio in foreign securities. The investments require prior approval 
from the central bank if they exceed US $6 million annually. Mutual funds issued outside 
the Philippines cannot be sold in the country unless they are registered with the SEC. 
 
In Singapore, offshore mutual funds and unit trusts have been able to offer units 
to Singapore residents since July 2002.  
 
In Thailand, the SEC in 2002 approved five mutual-fund management companies 
to establish and manage Foreign Investment Funds (FIFs) at a level of US $200m per 
year.  Investors are permitted to invest in overseas securities via FIFs.. 
 
 To summarize, Korea and Singapore have completely liberalized the entry of 
foreign-based funds. China allows foreign-based investment management companies 
enter the domestic market in the form of joint ventures, with foreign ownership capped 
at 49 percent. Foreign-based fund managers are allowed to enter the market in 
Malaysia with the Securities Commission’s approval.   In the Philippines, the authorities 
are working on legislation that will allow foreign funds to be listed in the domestic 
markets.   
 
Investment funds in the region face various restrictions on asset allocation in 
foreign securities, which severely restricts competition in the fund management industry 
as well as opportunities for portfolio diversification. Again, Korea and Singapore have 
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removed all such restrictions.  Other countries, however, impose caps on the 
percentage of assets that can be invested in overseas markets.  In Indonesia, funds are 
allowed to invest less that 15 percent of their net assets abroad. In Malaysia, the limit is 
30 percent.  In the Philippines the limit is 20 percent and the funds must seek prior 
approval from the central bank in order to invest in offshore markets.  Finally in Thailand 
the funds can invest up to a US$ 200 million in a yearly basis. 
 
 
Summary 
 
 There are considerable differences in the extent of development of the industry 
across individual countries in Asia.  The mutual fund industries of selected Asian 
countries, reviewed here, show a number of commonalities as well as differences. Most 
started out as closed-end funds before allowing open-end funds, a more investor-
friendly vehicle that has the advantage of avoiding the discounts often encountered in 
closed-end funds. In each case mutual funds occupy a very small niche in the domestic 
financial system, which is likely to grow in the future - as it has in developed financial 
markets. In each case as well, the mutual fund industry suffers from a lack of available 
local debt and equity instruments in which to invest, restrictions on asset allocation and 
on foreign portfolio investments, and in some cases questionable liquidity. Banks seem 
to be the principal vehicle for manufacturing and distributing mutual funds, which raises 
the issue of conflicts with comparable banking products. Finally, in most cases the 
authorities have made a serious effort to promulgate legislation and regulation support a 
properly structured mutual fund industry that will contribute to efficiency in local financial 
intermediation. 
 
Despite its small size compared to the mature financial markets, the growth rate 
of the mutual fund industry in the Asian region is rapid. In 2004, the mutual fund industry 
recorded a growth rate of 29.6 percent.  In China, the industry grew at  89.4 percent.  
The corresponding rates of growth in the Americas and in Europe were 10.3 percent 
and 20.2 percent respectively.  The industry is likely to continue growing rapidly as 
private wealth accumulates in the region - and as pension funds are increasingly 
liberalized (see below) to allow higher portions of assets under management to be 
invested in collective investment schemes.  
 
 
Contours of the Asset Management Industry: Pension Funds 
 
The pension fund market for asset management has been one of the most 
rapidly-growing domains of the global financial system, and promises to be even more 
dynamic in the years ahead. Consequently, pension assets have been in the forefront of 
strategic targeting by all types of financial institutions, including banks, trust companies, 
broker-dealers, insurance companies, mutual fund companies, and independent asset 
management firms. Pension assets in 2005 in countries where consistent and 
comparable data are available were estimated to amount to $23 trillion, roughly two-
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thirds of which covered private-sector employees and the balance covered public-sector 
employees. About 40% of global pension assets under management are in the United 
States, while Europe had pension assets of about $8.7 trillion in 2005, which is 
expected to increase to almost $20 trillion by 2015.14 
 
The basis for such projected growth is of course the demographics of gradually 
aging populations, colliding with existing structures for retirement support which in many 
countries carry heavy political baggage. They are politically exceedingly difficult to bring 
up to the standards required for the future, yet doing so eventually is an inevitability. 
The near-term foci of this problem will be Europe and Japan, with profound implications 
for the size and structure of capital markets, the competitive positioning and 
performance of financial intermediaries in general and asset managers in particular.  
 
 The demographics of the pension fund problem are straightforward, since 
demographic data are among the most reliable. Unless there are major unforeseen 
changes in birth rates, death dates or migration rates, the dependency ratio (population 
over 65 divided by the population age 16-64) will have doubled between 2000 and 
2040, with the highest dependency ratios in the case of Europe being attained in Italy, 
Germany and the Netherlands, and the lowest in Ireland. Japan has dependency ratios 
ever higher than Europe, while the US ratio is somewhat lower – with the lowest 
generally found in developing countries. All, however, are heading in the same direction.  
  
 While the demographics underlying these projections may be quite reliable, 
dependency ratios remain subject to shifts in working-age start- and end-points. 
Obviously, the longer people remain out of the active labor force (e.g., for purposes of 
education), the higher the level of sustained unemployment, and the earlier the average 
retirement age, the higher will be the dependency ratio. The collision comes between 
the demographics and the existing structure of pension finance. There are basically 
three ways to provide support for the post-retirement segment of the population: 
 
• Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) programs. Pension benefits under this approach are 
committed by the state based on various formulas - number of years worked and 
income subject to social charges, for example - and funded by current mandatory 
contributions of those employed (taxes and social charges) that may or may not 
be specifically earmarked to covering current pension payouts. Under PAYG 
systems, current pension contributions may exceed or fall short of current 
disbursements. In the former case a trust fund may be set up which, as in the 
case of U.S. Social Security, may be invested in government securities. In the 
latter case, the deficit will tend to be covered out of general tax revenues, 
government borrowing, or the liquidation of previously accumulated trust fund 
assets. 
 
                                                 
14 Allianz Global Investors at http://www.allianz.com/azcom/dp/cda/0,,763416-44,00.html 
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• Defined benefit programs. Pension benefits under such programs are committed 
to public or private-sector employees by their employers, based on actuarial 
benefit formulas that are part of the employment contract. Defined benefit 
pension payouts may be linked to the cost of living, adjusted for survivorship, 
etc., and the funds set-aside to support future claims may be contributed solely 
by the employer or with some level of  employee contribution. The pool of assets 
may be invested in a portfolio of debt and equity securities (possibly including the 
company’s own shares) that are managed in-house or by external fund 
managers. Depending on the level of contributions and benefit claims, as well as 
investment performance, defined-benefit plans may be over-funded or under-
funded. They may thus be tapped by the employer from time to time for general 
corporate purposes, or they may have to be topped-up from the employer’s own 
resources. Defined benefit plans may be insured (e.g., against corporate 
bankruptcy) either in the private market or by government agencies, and are 
usually subject to strict regulation - e.g., in the United States under ERISA, which 
is administered by the Department of Labor. 
 
• Defined contribution programs. Pension fund contributions are made by the 
employer, the employee, or both into a fund that will ultimately form the basis for 
pension benefits under defined contribution pension plans. The employee’s share 
in the fund tends to vest after a number of years of employment, and may be 
managed by the employer or placed with various asset managers under portfolio 
constraints intended serve the best interests of the beneficiaries. The employee’s 
responsibility for asset allocation can vary from none at all to virtually full 
discretion. Employees may, for example be allowed to select from among a 
range of approved investment vehicles, notably mutual funds, based on 
individual risk-return preferences. 
 
Most countries have several types of pension arrangement operating 
simultaneously - for example a base-level PAYG system supplemented by state-
sponsored or privately-sponsored defined-benefit plans and defined-contribution plans 
sponsored by employers, mandated by the state or undertaken voluntarily by 
individuals. 
 
The collision of the aforementioned demographics and heavy reliance on the part 
of many countries on PAYG approaches is at the heart of the pension problem, and 
forms the basis for the future growth of asset management. The conventional wisdom is 
that the pension problems that are today centered in Europe and Japan will eventually 
spread to the rest of the world. They will have to be resolved, and there are only a 
limited number of options in dealing with the issue: 
 
• Raise mandatory social charges on employees and employers to cover 
increasing pension obligations under PAYG systems. This is problematic 
specially in countries that already have high fiscal burdens and increasing 
pressure for avoidance and evasion. A similar problem confronts major increases 
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in general taxation levels or government borrowing to top-up eroding trust funds 
or finance PAYG benefits on a continuing basis. 
 
• Undertake major reductions in retirement benefits, cutting dramatically into 
benefit levels. The sensitivity of fiscal reforms to social welfare is illustrated by 
the fact that just limiting the growth in pension expenditures to the projected rate 
of economic growth from 2015 onward would reduce income-replacement rates 
from 45% to 30% over a period of 15 years, leaving those among the elderly 
without adequate personal resources in relative poverty. 
 
• Apply significant increases in the retirement age at which individuals are eligible 
for full PAYG-financed pensions, perhaps to age 70 for those not incapacitated 
by ill health. This is not a palatable solution in many countries that have been 
subject to pressure for reduced retirement age, compounded by chronically high 
unemployment especially in Europe, which has been widely used as a 
justification for earlier retirements. 
 
• Undertake significant pension reforms to progressively move away from PAYG 
systems toward defined-contribution and defined benefit schemes such as those 
widely used in the U.S., Chile, Singapore, Malaysia, the U.K., the Netherlands 
and Denmark. These differ in detail, but all involve the creation of large asset 
pools that are reasonably actuarially sound. 
 
 Given the relatively bleak outlook for the first several of these alternatives, it 
seems inevitable that increasing reliance will be placed on the last of these options. The 
fact is that future generations can no longer count on the present value of benefits 
exceeding the present value of contributions and social charges as the demographics 
inevitably turn against them in the presence of clear fiscal constraints facing 
governments. This bodes well for the future growth of the asset management industry 
emanating from the pension sector. 
 
Whereas there are wide differences among countries in their reliance on PAYG 
pension systems and in the degree of demographic and financial pressure to build 
actuarially viable pension asset pools, there are equally wide differences in how those 
assets have been allocated. The United States (not including the Social Security Trust 
Fund) and the United Kingdom have relied quite heavily on domestic equities. The 
same is true in the UK, although pension pools in many of the other European countries 
and Japan have relied more heavily of fixed-income securities. Similar differences exist 
among emerging market countries. 
 
The dramatic shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans in 
the United States, as an example, has led to strong linkages between pension funds 
and mutual funds. Numerous mutual funds - notably in the equities sector - are strongly 
influenced by 401(k) and other pension inflows. At the end of 2005, about 67% of 
mutual fund assets represented retirement accounts of various types in the United 
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States. Some50% of total retirement assets were invested in mutual funds, up from 
about 1% in 1980.15 This is reflected in the structure of the pension fund management 
industry in the United States. 
 
 In the most competitive parts of the pension sector, access to fund trustees often 
relies on consultants. Company-sponsored retirement plans often seek advice from 
pension investment consultants before awarding pension mandates, or to include 
particular mutual funds or fund families in the menu they offer to employees in 401k 
plans. Consultants are particularly useful in formal reviews of pension fund managers, 
the frequency of which (based in survey data) is depicted in Exhibit 20. Fund 
management companies may and sometimes do provide fee- or expense-
reimbursement to consultants, a practice that has increased in recent years. In the case 
of pension funds, the investment manager quotes a single, all-in expense to be charged 
for services which is sufficient to cover expenses and the manager’s profit. Pension 
fund trustees are able to apply the fund’s bargaining power to the process. 
 
To summarize, with respect to the pension component of growth in the asset 
management industry there is no single “magic bullet” solution to supporting the 
retirement of the “bulge” of baby boomers moving through population structures. 
Countries that are taking action are using a multi-pronged approach consisting of: 
 
• Increase working populations.  Immigration and increased labor force 
participation rates help but cannot solve the problem. Some perverse incentive 
structures impede labor force participation rate improvements. 
 
• Increase productivity.  Strong productivity growth is the single most important 
factor in alleviating the burden of global aging. However, productivity growth is 
difficult if not impossible to predict, and aging countries cannot rely on it. 
 
• Change the promise. Although it is politically difficult, countries are changing the 
minimum retirement age, modifying benefit levels and making it more tax 
advantageous for the elderly to work. As individuals realize that the benefit 
reductions already enacted and the future reductions will affect their retirement 
income, they may increase their savings. 
 
• Change the funding. Those countries with healthy funded private pension funds 
are in a better position to support their elderly population than those that rely on 
unfunded PAYG systems. Some countries are establishing funded pension trusts 
or using the proceeds of privatizations to establish trust funds for future 
generations. Others are encouraging personal plans or increasing funding 
ceilings on existing personal pension plans. 
 
                                                 
     15Brian Reid and Jean Crumrine, Retirement Plan Holdings of Mutual Funds, 1996 (Washington, D.C.: 
Investment Company Institute, 1997). 
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The consensus seems to be that the latter option provides the best way forward, 
both for advanced countries as well as for emerging market countries. And when this is 
combined with the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution approaches, 
discussed earlier, it should provide ample competitive opportunities for the asset 
management industry globally and within the Asian region. In this section, we review the 
state of the pension fund industry in Asia. Many countries have built, or are in process 
of building defined benefit and defined contribution programs in order to mitigate the 
effects of aging populations on future pension system deficits.  The growth of the 
defined benefit and defined contribution plans throughout Asia forms the basis for the 
future growth of asset management, as these programs involve the creation of large 
asset pools. 
 
 
The Pension Fund Management Industry in Asia 
 
The pension system in the Asian countries is predominantly organized and 
managed by their respective governments.  In Malaysia and Singapore, for example, 
single government-managed pension funds dominate the domestic asset management 
industry and they are among the largest pension systems in the world.  However, 
private funds in many of the countries are recently being introduced in order to 
supplement existing public pension schemes (Exhibit 21).   
 
China in 1995 modified its public pension system was changed from a pure pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) system to one comprising a PAYG portion and a funded portion.  In 
1997, more than 800 pension-fund schemes in operation throughout China were 
instructed to become unified by 2000 (“Decision on the Establishment of a Unified Basic 
Old Age System for Enterprise Staff and Workers”) and the National Council for Social 
Security Fund (SSF) was established at the same time to manage and administer the 
fund’s assets.  Under China’s unified pension system, employers pay 20 percent of 
employees’ annual salary into a Social Security Fund and 3 percent into an individual 
pension account. The employees pay 8 percent of their salaries into the individual 
account. 
 
China introduced voluntary corporate pension plans (Enterprise Annuity) as a 
supplement to social security in 1992. Companies that establish an Enterprise Annuity 
(EA) plan must also participate in the social security system, be up to date on 
contributions, appoint a trustee to oversee the plan, and manage annuity assets 
separately from the assets of the company and those of the asset management service 
providers.   
 
The Indonesian public insurance system includes three mandatory programs 
covering private sector employees, civil servants, and the armed forces.  Jamsostek 
(Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja) is mandatory savings scheme that provides coverage 
for employees of private sector and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with 10 or more 
employees or a monthly wage bill of at least Rp1 million.  Taspen (Tabungan dan 
 34
Asuransi Pegawai Negari) covers all civil servants and Asabri (Asuransi Social ABRI) 
covers the police, and civilian and military defense personnel.  Asabri is funded from 
current contributions and the Government’s general budget, and Taspen is partially 
funded from current and accumulated contributions, but is largely funded from the 
general budget. Jamsostek covers a provident fund and life insurance, work accident 
protection and health insurance. Under Jamsostek’s provident fund plan, employers 
contribute 3.7  of employees’ total salaries and employees contribute 2 percent of 
monthly wages.  Taspen and Asabri are both run as state-owned limited-liability 
companies.  Under Taspen, worker contributions are 4.75 percent of basic monthly 
salary and benefits are set at 2.5 percent of basic salary plus family allowance for each 
year worked (up to a maximum of 75 percent of basic salary and allowance) and are 
paid out when workers reach the age of 56.  
 
The mandatory public programs in Indonesia were established by separate laws 
and are supervised by separate ministries. The Jamsostek program is under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, the Taspen program is 
controlled by the Ministry of Finance, and the Asabri program is controlled by the 
Ministry of Defense.  The Ministry of Finance’s Pensions Directorate has authority to 
supervise voluntary pension schemes, but not the mandatory programs of Asabri or 
Jamsostek, which are considered effectively unsupervised.   
 
The mandatory public pension schemes in Indonesia can be supplemented by 
employees in the private sector through voluntary pensions (dana pensiuns) of two 
types - employer pension funds (DPPKs) and financial institution pension funds 
(DPLKs).   There were 327 pension funds in existence as of December 2003, including 
299 employer pension funds and 28 financial institutions funds.  Employer pension 
funds may be run either as defined-benefit plans or as defined contribution plans.  The 
country’s leading banks and insurance companies operate the largest independent 
pension funds.  The Ministry of Finance Pensions Directorate has the authority to 
supervise voluntary pension schemes in Indonesia.  The 1992 pension fund law 
requires that any company which has promised retirement benefits to its employees 
must set up a pension fund registered with the Directorate of Pensions or join a program 
established by a financial institution. Assets of pension funds must be segregated from 
those of the parent company. The law is ambiguous, however, about who can manage 
pension funds. In effect, they may be managed directly by their founders or by 
registered investment managers. Contributions are tax-deductible within prescribed 
limits, and investment earnings on the funds are tax-free. 
 
The Korean public pension scheme consists of the National Pension Scheme for 
employees of private companies and the self-employed persons, Government 
Employees Pension Scheme, Military Personnel Pension Scheme, and Private School 
Teachers Pension Scheme.  Under the National Pension Act introduced in 1988, 
workers pay up to 9 percent of their monthly income to the national pension schemes. 
The employers subsidize half of the workers’ contributions.  The National Pension 
Corporation (NPC) under the Ministry of Health and Welfare directly controls national 
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pensions.   
 
Personal pension plans in Korea were first introduced in 1994. Insurance 
companies have been allowed to sell occupational pension plans since 1999. 
Commercial banks and investment-trust management companies have been permitted 
to market occupational plans as trust accounts since 2000.   
 
Malaysia’s main provident and pension funds are the Employees Provident Fund 
(EPF), the Pensions Trust Fund (PTF), the Social Security Organization (SOCSO) and 
the Armed Forces Fund (AFF).  These are all government-managed asset pools, and 
the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia) regulates the pension fund 
management industry.  The Employees Provident Fund is by far the largest in Malaysia. 
It was established in 1951 and is governed by the 1991 EPF Act.  All employees in 
Malaysia who have reached the age of 16 and are employed must be registered as a 
member of the Employees Provident Fund. The employer contributes 12 percent of the 
employee's wages and the employee contributes 11 percent of the monthly wages 
towards his or her pension account.  
 
Private pension funds in Malaysia remain small. At present, Malaysians seeking 
additional retirement income usually invest in unit trusts (mutual funds) or life insurance 
policies. 
 
Singapore’s Central Provident Fund (CPF) that was established in 1955 as a 
mandatory, government-run retirement scheme and is the primary source of retirement 
funds.  The CPF operates four types of individual accounts: (1) An ordinary account, to 
finance the purchase of a home, approved investments, CPF insurance, and education; 
(2) A special account, principally for old-age provisions; (3) A medisave account, to pay 
for hospital treatment, medical care, and approved medical insurance; and (4) From age 
55, a retirement account to finance periodic benefit payments starting at age 62.  
Employees in Singapore contribute 20 percent of earnings if monthly earnings are over 
S$ 750; 0.6 percent of the amount over S$ 500 if monthly earnings are between S$ 500 
and S$ 750; and no contributions if monthly earnings are under S$ 500.  The employer 
pays 16 percent of payroll if monthly earnings are S$50 or over and provides no 
contribution for monthly earnings under S$ 500. Maximum earnings for contribution 
purposes are S$ 4,500 for both the employee and the employer.  
 
The Singapore Supplementary Retirement Scheme (SRS) is a tax-advantaged 
voluntary scheme and was introduced in 2001.  SRS permits Singapore citizens to save 
in a special individual account 15 percent of their total labor compensation. The 
Singapore government withdrew plans to introduce low-cost, voluntary private pension 
plans as a way to increase retirement savings. The decision in March 2005 followed 
consultations with pension fund experts and the public about the lack of industry 
incentives and the potential for investment losses under the proposed system.  
 
Thailand's pension system consists of three basic components: (1) The Social 
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Welfare Fund, a mandatory pay-as-you-go system covering virtually the entire private 
nonagricultural labor force of about 7.7 million workers with reserves of Tbt 242 billion 
(US$ 6.3 billion); (2) The Government Pension Fund, covering approximately 2 million 
civil servants with reserves in excess of Tbt 240 billion (US $6.3 billion); and 
(3) Provident funds, covering 1.5 million workers in private companies and certain state 
agencies with reserves worth about Tbt 293 billion(US$ 7.7 billion).  A compulsory 
defined benefits old age pension scheme for private sector employees was introduced 
in Thailand on 31 December 1998. The scheme called “Old Aged Pension Fund” 
(OAPF) operates under the Thai Social Welfare Fund.  The Social Security Act defines 
the combined contribution rate for old age pension and child allowance to be collected 
from 3 parties: employer, employee and the government, at a rate which altogether 
does not exceed 9 percent of wage (employer 4 percent, employee 4 percent and 
government 1 percent). The actual contribution rate for the old age pension is 8 percent 
- the employer contributes 3.5 percent, the employee contributes 3.5 percent, and the 
government contributes 1 percent.  The Government Pension Fund (GPF) was 
established in 1997 for government employees and operates on a defined contribution 
basis.  The GPF had 1.16 million members, and held assets worth Tbt 246.8 billion 
(US$ 6.3 billion) at the end of 2004 making it the country’s largest institutional investor.  
 
There are two kinds of private pension funds in Thailand - provident funds and 
retirement mutual funds. The Provident Fund Act was promulgated in 1987 to 
encourage private sector employees to save for retirement.  The fund is based on 
voluntary defined benefit system. A fund committee, comprised of employer and 
employee representatives, chooses the fund managers and oversees the provident 
fund. The provident fund is regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Thailand (SEC).  Employees and employers both contribute, and fund regulations 
currently allow public- and private-sector salaried workers to save up to Tbt 
300,000 (US$ 7,845) per year, or 15 percent of their monthly salary. The employee’s 
contribution is 2-15 percent of the salary, and employers contribute at a level equal to or 
higher than the employee. If employers wish to contribute at a higher rate than 15 
percent, they must seek approval from the Ministry of Finance.  
 
The concept of the retirement mutual fund (RMF) was established in Thailand in 
March 2001, aiming to provide a means for voluntary retirement savings for employees 
not in the provident fund or who want to make the additional contributions. 
 
 
Pension Fund Size and Asset Allocation 
 
Public-sector pension systems are much larger in Asian countries compared to 
the private pension plans.  They are heavily invested in government bonds and bank 
deposits.  (Exhibit 22) 
 
The Social Security Fund in China controlled about Rmb171.1 billion (US$ 20.7 
billion) in assets at the end of 2003, the latest data available. The scope of investment 
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of the Social Security Fund is limited to bank deposits, treasury bonds and other 
financial instruments having acceptable liquidity, including tradable securities, 
investment funds, stocks, corporate bonds and financial institution bonds whose credit 
rating is above that of the issuer. Additional regulations introduced in 2001 allowed the 
Fund to invest up to 40 percent in equities and an additional 10 percent in corporate 
bonds. The revised rules also allocated at least 10 percent to bank deposits and a total 
of at least 50 percent to bank deposits and government bonds. In December 2002 the 
government picked six fund-management companies to manage the Social Security 
Fund. The six fund-management companies began investing in Chinese equities in 
June 2003.   
 
China’s Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS) issued regulations in 
2004 to establish a framework for China's new system of voluntary corporate retirement 
plans to safeguard the investment of occupational pension fund assets.  In 2005 
MOLSS gave approval for 37 financial institutions to manage voluntary occupational 
pension funds under China's the Enterprise Annuity program. The first operating 
licenses were awarded 1n August 2005 to 15 Chinese investment managers, four of 
which are joint ventures with foreign companies. An additional 22 licenses were 
awarded to companies providing administrative services, such as custodians, trustees, 
and administrators.  
 
Voluntary corporate pension plans (Enterprise Annuity) in China are intended to 
be fully funded, defined contribution individual accounts, subject to stringent oversight. 
The governance structure requires a plan trustee to oversee the pension fund and 
appoint a plan administrator, a custodian, and an investment manager.  A separate 
license is required for each of these functions. Guidelines for enterprise annuity service 
providers to obtain operating licenses were issued in early February 2006.  Enterprise 
annuity fund managers oversee the portfolio selection, and there is no employee choice.  
Investment restrictions require that at least 20 percent be invested in liquid assets 
(money market funds, for example); a maximum of 50 percent in fixed-income products 
and convertible bonds, including a minimum of 20 percent in government bonds; and a 
maximum of 30 percent in equities (stocks, mutual funds, and investment-linked 
insurance products).  In addition, investment managers are be required to put 
20 percent of administrative fees into a separate trust fund as a contingency against 
possible investment losses. At the end of 2005 China's voluntary pension plan assets 
stood at about Rmb 50 billion (US$ 6.19 billion).16  
 
In Indonesia, Jamsostek had membership of 23 million employees and assets of 
Rp 30 trillion as of end-2004. In terms of asset allocation, equity investments comprised 
Rp 489 billion, bonds made up Rp14.1 trillion and other mutual fund investments made 
up Rp14.37 trillion. Taspen had Rp 9.59 trillion in funds under management as of May 
2005.  As of end-2003, net assets of private pension funds in Indonesia totalled Rp 49.8 
                                                 
16 Source: www.ssa.gov - International Update, September 2005. 
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trillion.  Investment portfolios consist largely of bank deposits, bonds, short-term 
securities, real estate and mutual funds.  Pension funds may invest all their funds in 
mutual funds - up to 10% of any pension fund’s total investment is permitted in any 
single mutual fund. Investments in time deposits and certificates of deposit may be 
placed only with a bank that is neither the founder nor an affiliate of the founder of the 
pension fund, and pension funds are not permitted to invest offshore. Pension funds in 
Indonesia dominate investments in the national bond market by investing in corporate 
bonds and Bank Indonesia bills (SBIs). The rest of their funds are invested in the stock 
market. Pension funds can invest only 15 percent in affiliated companies. They are 
permitted to invest in commercial paper and bonds with a maturity of more than one 
year, but they can invest no more than 10% in companies or bonds listed for less than 
three years and cannot lend directly to firms. However, a pension fund can invest 100% 
of its funds in shares of companies that have been listed for three years or more. 
 
The National Pension Corporation (NPC) in Korea had 17m subscribers and 
W149.4 trillion (US$145 billion) in total assets and W128 trillion (US$ 124.2 billion) 
under management as of end-September 2004. In 1999 the NPC launched an in-house 
fund-management unit, with a group of professional managers hired from the private 
sector.  The NPF is invested largely into three asset classes – public sector, financial 
and welfare. The principal public sector investment consist of treasury bonds, while 
financial sector instruments include the public and private bonds, stocks, beneficiary 
certificates, trust funds, and other types of securities. Assets in the welfare sector are 
establishment and operation of welfare facilities and loans to pension beneficiaries and 
for construction of welfare facilities for children and elderly people. As of end- 
September 2004, W8.3 trillion, or 6.5 percent, of NPF funds under management were 
allocated to public and welfare projects, and W118 trillion (US$ 8.1 billion) were 
invested in financial market instruments of various kinds. Some W107.9 trillion (US$ 
104.7 billion), or 91.4 percent were invested in fixed-income securities, and another 
7.8% were invested in stocks. 
 
The NPC commissions a group of asset-management firms and investment 
advisors to manage public pension assets.  In an effort to make public asset 
management more efficient, the Ministry of Budget and Planning launched an 
“investment pool management committee” in 2001.  The committee, which consists of 
private- and public-sector experts, selects professional fund managers to operate public 
funds under outsourcing contracts and monitors their performance.  As of end-
November 2004 some 16 firms were under outsourcing contracts to manage about 
US$4.2 billion in public funds invested in the financial markets.  A December 2000 
amendment to the National Pension Act lifted a ban on investment in foreign securities, 
venture capital and exchange-traded derivatives.  
 
There are no aggregate data for the private pension plans for Korea.  The 
combined balance of occupational pension funds in insurance accounts and trust 
accounts stood at over W16 trillion (US$ 15.5 billion) at end-June 2003. 
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As of end-2004, there were 13 provident and pension funds in Malaysia, which 
managed assets totaling M$ 291.3 billion (US$ 76.9 billion). Competition in the 
Malaysian pension fund market is very limited. Overall, there were 21.2 million 
contributors to the provident and pension funds as of end-2004.  The Employees 
Provident Fund (EPF) and SOSCO held a near duopoly in pension fund management, 
with 20.9 million contributors between them. The EPF held M$ 240.3 billion (US$ 63.3 
billion) in assets - 82.5%, of the total assets in the industry.  EPF was also the largest 
institutional investor in Malaysia, owning around 8 percent of the total capitalization of 
the national stock market – and one of the largest pension funds in the world. The EPF 
maintains a 30% floor on investments in Malaysian government bonds and 20% ceilings 
in both equities and non-Malaysian assets.  As a result, the EPF mainly invests in 
government securities. Of its M$ 248.6 billion (US$ 65.6 billion) in investments in 2005, 
M$ 94.8 billion (US$ 25 billion) or 38.1% were invested in government securities, M$ 
83.3 billion (33.5%) in other types of Malaysian bonds, M$ 48.2 billion (US$ 21.98 
billion) or 19.4% in equities, M$ 20.6 billion (US$ 5.43 billion) or 8.3% in money-market 
instruments and M$1.8 billion (US$ 480 million) or 0.7% in real estate (Exhibit 23). The 
fund also allocated M$1 billion to private-equity investments, M$ 200m of which was 
invested in eight companies as of end-September 2005. The Employee Provident Fund 
(Amendment) Act of 1996 allows EPF participants to invest some of their contributions 
in the capital markets via mutual funds/unit trusts. The government has appointed 25 
Malaysian financial institutions as designated fund managers to handle these 
investments.  
 
The investment option, which is limited to contributors by employees younger 
than 55 with savings exceeding M$ 50,000, allows withdrawals of a maximum 20% of 
any surplus exceeding M$ 50,000 for capital-market investment. In 2004 the EPF 
allocated M$ 800 million (US$ 211 million) to external fund managers, to be followed by 
M$ 1.75 billion (US$ 0.460 million) each year for 2005–07 – Exhibit 24. The EPF is also 
an active investor in the country’s economic infrastructure. It was the single largest 
financier of the M$ 9 billion Kuala Lumpur International Airport. To enable it to finance 
private-sector activity, the EPF Act was liberalized in 1991 to allow the EPF to channel 
up to 50% of its annual investable funds (up from 30%) into private securities. The EPF 
can invest overseas only with the approval of the Ministry of Finance.  In June 2005 the 
EPF appointed Aberdeen Asset Management, the first foreign fund manager to receive 
a license to operate in Malaysia, to manage its overseas investments, and in October 
2005 it was seeking approval to invest as much as US$ 1 billion in private-equity funds 
and fixed-income securities overseas. 
 
Private pension funds are very small in Malaysia.  Combined assets of private 
funds were M$1.1 billion at year-end 2004. 
 
In Singapore there were three million Central Provident Fund (CPF) members as 
of mid-2005, with a total balance of S$ 114.9 billion (US$ 69.54 billion) in their accounts. 
Under the CPF Investment Scheme (CPFIS) members can invest their Ordinary 
Account and Special Account savings. Under CPFIS-Ordinary Account (CPFIS-OA), 
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members can invest up to 35% of savings (Ordinary Account balance plus net amounts 
withdrawn for education and investments) in shares, corporate bonds and property 
funds, while 10% can be invested in gold.  As of September 2005, 25 percent of total 
CPF balances were invested in stocks and bonds, 63.4 percent in insurance policies, 
and 11,1 percent in unit trusts.  CPF members earn a market-based interest rate on 
their savings, subject to a minimum rate of 2.5 percent (CPF Board, 2004).  Funds in 
the Medisave, Special and Retirement funds earn an additional 1.5 percent, or 4 
percent minimum per annum.  The interest rate is a weighted average of the 12-month 
fixed deposit rate and saving rates at major banks. The weights are 80 percent and 20 
percent respectively.  Restrictions on investing in overseas markets were eliminated in 
1998. The potential for international diversification is available only through unit-trusts. 
 
In Thailand, the investment guidelines for the OAPF must comply with the 
regulations of the Social Security Subcommittee on Investment. The Subcommittee 
consists of employers, employees, government representatives and investment experts, 
and provides recommendations to the SSO, who then request approval from the Social 
Security Committee in compliance with the Ministry of Finance guidelines. In December 
2003, size of the OAPF was about Tbt 117.39 billion. The assets of the OAPF are 
invested mainly in Thai bonds.  Only 2.80 percent of the fund was invested in equities 
and 3.9 percent was invested in state owned enterprise equities. The major holdings are 
state enterprises and commercial banks 24%, government and government guaranteed 
bonds 37.2%, state enterprise bonds 10.7%, and equities 6.7% 
 
The GPF must invest at least 60 percent of its portfolio in low-risk assets (cash, 
bank deposits, government bonds, investment grade bonds and securitized bonds) and 
40 percent in high-risk assets (stocks and warrants, corporate debentures, mutual finds, 
real estate).  There is a 20 percent limit on stocks, warrants and convertible debentures 
and a 10 percent limit on single company's stock, warrants and debentures. Like other 
Thai-based investors, the OAPF is not able to invest abroad directly. At end of 2003, the 
provident fund covered 1.41 million employees in 5,760 enterprises with total fund size 
of Tbt 287.3 billion (US$ 7.2 billion). As of November 2005, the net asset value of 
provident funds was almost US$ 8 billion.  
 
Fund managers in Thailand provide a number of retirement mutual funds with 
various risk profiles, and the investor can switch assets between funds. As of December 
2003, total RMF funds were Tbt 8.3 billion  (US$ 208.4 million).  Private pension funds 
in Thailand are permitted to invest in real estate, mutual funds geared toward financial-
institution restructuring, property and loan funds, as well as derivatives. Investment in 
each of these types of funds is limited to 5% of the fund’s net asset value, and total 
investment in all such funds must not exceed 15% of NAV.  
 
The Thai Finance Ministry has announced plans to convert the existing 
framework of voluntary provident funds into a mandatory centralized system. The 
proposal is the latest in a series of efforts to encourage retirement savings and would 
provide additional coverage for low wage-earners.  Details of the new system are 
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expected to be announced in April 2006, with implementation set for later in 2006.17 
 
 
Summary 
 
 Pension assets and the adequacy of old-age provisioning in the developing 
countries Asia have, in relative terms, outpaced those in many developed countries. 
First, they have relatively young populations and gradual aging, so that they have more 
time to develop pre-funded pension schemes without some of the friction burdens of 
countries with much older populations.  Second, they are much less reliant on PAYG 
pension systems with high and possibly unsustainable promises to pension 
beneficiaries. Most systems are defined-contribution and therefore pre-funded, with 
systems like the Singapore CPF among the exemplars globally – although all such 
systems are prone to investment returns that may not meet expectations.  Most also are 
controlled by the state and offer only limited portfolio discretion for pension plan 
participants, limited management by private asset managers, and limited choice of 
asset classes. Given that defined contribution pension systems represent key pools of 
investible assets in these countries, increased choice and competition among asset 
managers - as well as increased choice among asset classes - could make a significant 
contribution both the soundness of pension schemes and to capital market 
development. 
 
 
Contours of the Asset Management Industry: Private Clients 
 
One of the largest segments of institutionally-managed assets globally is related 
to high net-worth individuals and families, generally grouped under the heading of 
“private clients.” Total funds under management have been estimated at over $70 trillion 
in 2004 - significantly exceeding the size of the global pension asset-pool. Because of 
very different investment objectives and service requirements, private client wealth is 
usually segmented according to investible assets (not including real estate) under 
management (AUM) – as shown in Exhibit 25. Mass affluent, emerging wealthy and 
established wealthy categories are broken out separately, with the first category (assets 
of between $100,000 and $1 million) accounting for about two thirds of global AUM. 
Mass affluent investors’ assets are usually deployed in bank deposits, certificates of 
deposit, traded financial instruments and to the extent they are managed on a fiduciary 
basis they tend to be found in the mutual funds and pension funds sectors, discussed 
earlier. 
 
True private client AUM is therefore found in the segments denoted as “emerging 
wealthy” and “established wealthy” in Exhibit 25– accounting for anywhere between $25 
and $45 trillion globally – depending on the data and AUM segments. It should be noted 
that data in this area are notoriously unreliable, since there is no systematic disclosure 
                                                 
17 See www.ssc.gov - International Update. 
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and data collection effort worldwide. Consequently, published data tends to be 
aggregated from small samples based on various assumptions.  Bearing that caveat in 
mind, Exhibit 26 provides a rough estimate of the geographic location of global private 
wealth – with almost half arising in the Americas and about  one quarter each in Europe 
and Asia – although growth is expected to be proportionately higher in the latter region, 
especially non-Japan Asia. 
 
Exhibit 27 indicates estimated deployment of private client asset pools, in that 
case including real estate, for 2002 and 2003. According to these estimates, about 25% 
of investments are allocated to bonds, 10% to bank deposits, 36% to equities and 13% 
to alternative investments like hedge finds and private equities. The asset management 
industry would be active in all except the banking domain. 
 
Private client asset management objectives are an amalgam of preferences 
across a number of variables among which liquidity, yield, security, tax-efficiency, 
confidentiality, and service-level are paramount. Each of these plays a distinctive role. 
 
! Capital Preservation and Yield. Traditional private clients have been concerned 
with wealth preservation in the face of antagonistic government policies and 
fickle asset markets. Clients usually demand the utmost in discretion from their 
private bankers, with whom they sometimes maintain lifelong relationships 
initiated by personal recommendations. Such clients have to some degree given 
way to more active and sophisticated individuals. Aware of opportunity costs and 
often exposed to high marginal tax rates, they considered net after-tax yield to be 
far more relevant than the security and focus on capital-preservation traditionally 
sought by high net-worth individuals. They may prefer gains to accrue in the form 
of capital appreciation rather than interest or dividend income, and tend to  have 
a much more active response to changes in total rate of return. 
 
! Security. The environment faced by high net-worth investors is arguably more 
stable today than it has been in the past. The probability of revolution, war and 
expropriation has declined over the years in Europe, North America, the Far East 
and Latin America. Nevertheless, a large segment of the private banking market 
remains highly security-conscious. Such clients are generally prepared to trade-
off yield for stability, safety and capital preservation. 
 
! Tax-efficiency. Like everyone else, high net-worth clients are highly sensitive to 
taxation, perhaps more so as cash-strapped politicians target “the rich” in a 
constant search for fiscal revenues. International financial markets have 
traditionally provided plenty of tax-avoidance and tax-evasion opportunities 
ranging from offshore tax havens to private banking services able to sidestep 
even sophisticated efforts to claim the state=s share. 
 
! Confidentiality. Secrecy is a major factor in private banking - secrecy required for 
personal reasons, for business reasons, for tax reasons and for legal or political  
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reasons. Confidentiality, in this sense, is a “product” that is bought and sold as 
part of private asset management business through secrecy and blocking 
statutes on the part of countries and high levels of discretion on the part of 
financial institutions. The value of this product depends on the probability and 
consequences of disclosure, and is “priced” in the form of lower portfolio returns, 
higher fees, sub-optimum asset allocation, or reduced liquidity as compared with 
portfolios not driven by confidentiality motives.18 
 
! Service level. While some of the tales of personal services provided for private 
banking clients are undoubtedly apocryphal, the "fringe benefits" offered to high 
net-worth clients may well influence the choice of and loyalty to a particular 
financial institution. Such benefits may save time, reduce anxiety, increase 
efficiency, or make the wealth management process more convenient. Personal 
service is a way for personal asset managers to show their full commitment to 
clients accustomed to high levels of personal service in their daily lives. 
 
                                                 
     18 See Ingo Walter, The Secret Money Market (New York: Harper Collins, 1990). 
The essence of private banking is to identify accurately each client's unique 
objectives, and to have the flexibility and expertise to satisfy these as fully as possible in 
a highly competitive marketplace. On the assumption that the majority of funds 
managed by private banking vendors have not been accumulated illegally, the demand 
for financial secrecy relates mainly to matters of taxation and transfers of funds across 
borders. Tax issues will take much longer to deal with, and will probably always be a 
major driver of the international private banking industry. Consequently, private client 
assets are usually divided into “offshore” (assets deployed outside the country of 
residence of the investor) and “onshore” assets. 
 
As Exhibit 28 suggests, in the mid-1990s about 2/3 of private client assets were 
estimated to be onshore and the balance (perhaps $6 trillion) offshore. Exhibit 29 
identifies the major motivations for maintaining offshore private banking accounts, as 
well as and the competitive basis of offshore private banking centers. Exhibit 30 notes 
the principal destinations for “offshore” managed assets, with Switzerland capturing a 
global market share of about one-third. 
 
This is changing. The tax-haven status of Austria and Luxembourg has been 
constrained under fiscal pressure from EU partner countries, and the member states 
have come together some way on rules regarding personal taxation and disclosure of 
tax information. So the ability to conceal private wealth from tax collectors has 
diminished, as it already had in the United States, Japan and various other countries 
where tax evasion is a criminal offense and enforcement is vigorous.  Even Switzerland, 
in its attempt to remain as a European haven for those intent on avoiding home-country 
taxation (as distinct from those committing fax fraud as defined under Swiss law) has 
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been constrained by an agreement with EU member states to withhold taxes on capital 
income to the treasuries of countries of investor residence, as opposed to the 
alternative – disclosing their identities and account holdings. However, the use of shell 
companies, nominee accounts and other techniques appears to have limited the 
effectiveness of this approach. 
 
The future of offshore private banking hinges on a number of issues that are 
likely to limit its growth. These include more effective tax coordination, cooperation and 
alignment among national authorities, tighter notification and reporting requirements 
imposed on banks dealing with suspect or under-regulated banks and countries, 
international agreements to expand account investigation related to money laundering 
and the financing of terrorism, including focus on accountants and lawyers, and the use 
of “cordons sanitaires” in the case of non-cooperating institutions and countries. Given 
these developments, most observers believe that the “offshore” component of private 
client asset allocation is likely to grow much more slowly than global private wealth as a 
whole, suggesting in terms of Exhibit 28 that the bulk of the growth is likely to come in 
the “onshore” domain. 
 
If indeed private client wealth management in the future is likely to focus on the 
“onshore” sector, firms competing for this business will have to address a number of 
distinct client segments. These include: 
 
• “Traditional” high net worth individuals and families require comprehensive 
advice on portfolio structures, proper inheritance planning and  long-term 
investment strategies, with possible interest in global investing and trading 
opportunities. 
 
• Entrepreneurs / Mittelstand represent the  driver of wealth creation in most 
countries, and require integrated advice on matters of business finance and 
personal finance. 
 
• Professionals and executives comprise self-employed professionals, partners in 
professional firms, financiers, and traders, highly-paid executives including those 
with stock options and share plans. They usually have complex and tax-driven 
compensation and asset-holding patterns, including multi-country requirements 
 
• Others such as entertainers, artists, writers, sports professionals and others who 
have become seriously wealthy as a result of personal talent and effort, and who 
tend to focus on employment-related income generation and wealth 
accumulation, viewed as an “employment relationship asset.” 
 
• Financial intermediaries and external asset managers constitute another private 
client base, including family offices of the very wealthy. This seems to be a 
substantial and growing acquisition channel for clients that cannot be attracted 
directly, and includes accountants and law firms which deal with the wealthy. 
 
 45
 
 In the process, onshore private asset managers find it necessary to optimize 
across some sort of “value chain” such as that depicted in Exhibit 31, which breaks-out 
the key functions and shows how they are interrelated.  
 
 
Available Evidence on the Private Client Industry in Asia 
 
 Data on asset management for private clients are extremely difficult to assemble 
on a coherent basis.  Onshore wealth management data suffer from variations in wealth 
cutoffs separating “private” and “retail” assets under management, which are often 
specific to individual financial institutions.  Offshore wealth management involves a high 
level of confidentiality, and there is little systematic data available from the financial 
intermediaries involved. Based on the estimates presented in Exhibit 26, however, 
roughly $2.3 trillion of the $41 trillion of total client assets in 2004 are estimated to arise 
in Asia, with disproportionate growth expected in the years ahead. 
 
 Assets under management (AUM) are not generally broken down for high net 
worth clients onshore domestically in the various countries, where definitional issues 
define the AUM cutoffs and data are generally undisclosed, and certainly not for 
offshore AUM where the drivers usually involve political or economic instability, tax 
evasion or avoidance, and similar motivations.  Three locations, however probably 
account for the vast bulk of managed private client wealth in Asia – Japan, Singapore 
and Hong Kong. As China develops large pools of private wealth that need to be 
managed, it will join this group as well. 
 
Most large local and foreign banks in Singapore maintain asset-management 
units that also serve as key distribution vehicles for asset-management firms serving 
high net worth investors. Singapore has a dominant position in serving the needs of 
private clients in the Southeast Asian region, one of the fastest growing in the world in 
terms of net new money inflows. 
 
Hong Kong attracts high-net-worth individuals from around the region. Almost 
every major international bank doing business in the territory has a private banking 
division, seeking to cater to high-net-worth individuals with at least US$1million to 
invest. All of the world’s major private banks have operations in the Special 
Administrative Region (SAR).  Such private banking activities were recorded at HK$ 636 
billion (US$ 81.78bn) in 2004, of which 58 percent were sourced from Hong Kong 
investors and the rest from non-Hong Kong investors. 
 
Asset management for private clients remains a minor financial activity in 
Indonesia. Most pension funds continue to be held by the state or private employers, 
although the growth of mutual funds should give rise to more professional management. 
Wealthy private individuals tend to hold substantial assets abroad, especially in 
Singapore. 
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Commercial banks in Korea have been introducing the concept of private 
banking. According to the Bank of Korea, assets in private banking accounts amounted 
to W48.5trn at end-2003, or 17.4% of all household deposits. Wrap accounts, which 
allow money managers to offer and manage a group of investments in stocks, bonds 
and cash funds for a flat fee, received regulatory approval in September 2000.  Only full 
service securities companies can handle wrap accounts, which must have at least 
W100m (US$ 100,000) per personal account and W200m (US$ 200,000) per corporate 
account.  At least 30 percent of the assets in these accounts must be invested in high-
yield bonds. Cash management accounts (CMAs), a South Korean version of US 
money market mutual funds, pool funds from multiple investors. Investment in CMAs 
through short-term financing houses requires an initial minimum deposit of W4m (about 
US$ 430).  According to Morgan Stanley Research, 13 to 14 percent of the fees of 
Kookmin and Hana Banks came from wealth management services, for example. 
 
Private banking in Malaysia is mostly offered by the larger domestic banks or by 
foreign banks such as HSBC, Standard Chartered Bank and Citibank.  It is usually a 
premium service providing current accounts, safe-deposit boxes and complimentary 
credit-card memberships to selected customers. Major individual investors in Malaysia 
still turn to financial institutions in more mature and more liberal financial markets such 
as Singapore and Hong Kong to manage their assets.  
 
Major local and foreign-based banks in the Philippines segment their individual 
clients to carve-out high net worth individuals. However, as in other developing 
countries in the Asian region, where the law permits wealthy private individuals tend to 
hold a substantial part of their assets overseas. 
 
The traditional activities of Western-style asset-management firms targeting high 
net worth clients have not yet appeared in China. However, a number of foreign banks 
that are prominent in private banking have taken stakes in Chinese banks and securities 
firms, presumably with a view to building the private client business as serious wealth 
develops in China in the years ahead.  Private banking in China has mostly focused on 
the management of offshore accounts for Chinese residents who have managed to 
establish a wealth position abroad, much of the activity occurring in Singapore, Hong 
Kong and Switzerland.  Foreign private bankers might visit Chinese clients and suggest 
various investment alternatives abroad, but stay clear of the actual expatriation of funds 
for fear of running afoul of strict Chinese currency and tax regulations.   
 
Domestically, Chinese wealth management was highly underdeveloped in terms 
of private banking services, asset allocation opportunities and limits on foreign 
investments. Given the WTO-induced liberalization of the activities of foreign banks in 
China at the end of 2006, major players such as UBS, Credit Suisse, HSBC and 
Citigroup will be able to accept deposits from wealthy individuals which can be 
channeled into higher-margin investment products. The banks’ offshore client base has 
provided a useful platform for developing their onshore business in China, and to take 
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advantage of the weak client-information systems and service capabilities of the local 
banks – although this should change before long due to joint ventures with foreign 
banks. The size of the private banking market in China is estimated to rise from $$825 
billion in 2004 to $1.606 billion in 2009.19 Nevertheless, there appears a good deal of 
protectionist sentiment in China in favor of delaying the licensing of foreign private 
banks while domestic banks remain well behind in their ability to offer private client 
services. 
 
 
Some Country Specific Attributes of Asset Management in Asia 
 
 A number of the countries in Asia have unique characteristics in terms of the 
structure of their asset management industries, sometimes related to the restructuring 
of their banking systems and specifically disposal of non-performing bank loans (NPLs). 
 
Hong Kong as a Continuing Regional Leader 
 
Hong Kong has the largest concentration of international fund managers in Asia.  
According to the 2004 Fund Management Activities Survey by the Securities and 
Futures Commission (SFC), the aggregate amount of assets in the combined fund 
management business reported by licensed corporations and registered institutions 
amounted to HK$ 3,618 billion (US$ 465.3 billion) at the end of 2004 – see Exhibit  32.  
Institutional funds, non SFC-authorized funds, and pension funds have been the major 
types of funds managed, representing 39%, 24% and 15% of the total AUM of licensed 
corporations and registered institutions, respectively.  SFC-authorized funds, private 
client funds and mandatory provident funds accounted for the remaining 22%, as shown 
in Exhibit 33.  
 
Hong Kong registered institutions provide a broad range of services in managing 
clients’ portfolios of securities and/or futures contracts incidental to client-driven dealing 
in securities or derivatives. By geographical origin, non-Hong Kong investors remained 
the major source of funds, accounting for 83 percent of the advisory business – see 
Exhibit 34. The amount of assets advised in Hong Kong accounted for 63 percent of the 
total Asian advisory business in 2004 - see Exhibit 35 for the pattern of asset allocation 
and Exhibit 36 by type of asset managed.  
 
 
Singapore as the Leading Asset Management Center in Southeast Asia 
 
In addition to the strength of private client asset management in Singapore, it 
appears that institutional clients continue to account for about 46 percent of assets 
under management, with individuals and collective investment schemes each 
accounting for 27 percent. Equities accounted for 44 percent of assets under 
                                                 
19 Boston Consulting Group, as cited in Financial Times, 12 March 2006. 
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management, bonds for 22 percent, collective investment schemes for 6 percent, 
money-market assets for 17 percent, and alternative assets for 11 percent – see Exhibit 
37. The average AUM of asset management entities was S$ 2.3 billion (US$ 1.40 
billion) in 2004.  There were 10 asset management entities managing more than S$10 
billion (US$ 6.1 billion) in assets, accounting for 31 percent of total AUM.  Asset 
managers with less than S$1 billion (US$ 610 million) in AUM numbered 132 in 2004, 
and accounted for 7 percent of total AUM. Most of these managers are indigenous 
companies – 111  in 2004. Indigenous asset management companies accounted for 
25% and 38% of discretionary AUM and total employment of investment professionals 
respectively. 
 
As of end-2004, total assets managed by Singapore-based financial institutions 
were reported to be S$572.6 billion (US$ 350 billion) – see Exhibit 38. With more than 
70% of total AUM sourced from abroad, Singapore retained its role as an international 
asset management center.  Asia-Pacific countries remained the main markets for 
Singapore-based asset managers in 2004, accounting for 46 percent of total funds 
sourced. 19.4 percent were sourced from Europe, 9 percent came from the United 
States, and the remaining 25.3 percent were from other markets.  New high growth 
markets have emerged. Funds sourced from the Middle East and South Asia grew 76 
percent and 53percent p.a. respectively in 2004. 
 
 
Competitive Dynamics in the Asset Management Industry 
 
 To summarize, we have identified the key components of the “buy side” of 
financial markets – the asset management industry in terms of its principal domains. 
These are open-end and closed-end mutual funds, pension funds, fiduciary assets 
managed on behalf of foundations, endowments, central banks and other large asset-
holders, as well as assets managed on behalf of private clients. In the following sections 
of this paper, we will make come observational about competition among asset 
management firms, and finally develop some linkages between asset management and 
the development of efficient, resilient and robust capital markets in an emerging market 
context, 
 
We have noted earlier that various kinds of financial firms have emerged to 
perform asset-management functions - commercial banks, savings banks, postal 
savings institutions, savings cooperatives, credit unions, securities firms (full-service 
firms and various kinds of specialists), insurance companies, finance companies, 
finance subsidiaries of industrial companies, mutual fund companies, hedge funds 
financial advisers and various others. Members of each strategic group compete with 
each other, as well as with members of other strategic groups. There are two questions. 
First, what determines competitive advantage in operating distribution gateways to the 
end-investor? Second, what determines competitive advantage in the asset 
management process itself? 
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 One supposition is that distribution of asset management services is both scope-
driven and technology-driven. That is, asset management services can be distributed 
jointly with other types of financial services, and thereby benefit from cost economies of 
scope as well as demand economies of scope (cross-selling). Commercial banks may 
be able to cross-sell asset management services with banking products. Insurance 
companies may be able to cross-sell asset management services with insurance by 
incorporating: insurance features in asset management products – like fixed and 
variable annuities.  Broker-dealers may be able to cross-sell asset management 
services with brokerage services and use broker networks to distribute funds, benefiting 
in the process from greater earnings stability and possibly captive buy-side placing 
power for securities.  Nonfinancial corporations may be able to incorporate asset 
management services into in-house pension plan management  and employee 
shareholder plans (ESOPs).  For private banks, as noted, asset management is a key 
aspect of the private banking value-chain. 
 
Such cross-links would tend to give retail-oriented financial services firms like 
commercial and universal banks, life insurance companies and savings institutions a 
competitive advantage in distribution. At the same time, more-specialized firms may 
establish cost-effective distribution of asset management services using proprietary 
remote-marketing techniques like the mails, telephone selling or the Internet, or by 
“renting” distribution through the established infrastructures of other financial 
intermediaries like banks, insurance companies or mutual fund supermarkets. They may 
also gain access through fund management consultants and financial advisers. 
 
Asset management itself, of course, depends heavily on portfolio management 
skills as well as economies of scale, capital investment and technologies involved in 
back-office functions, some of which can be outsourced. Since fiduciary activities must 
be kept separate from other financial services operations that involve potential conflicts 
of interest, either through organizational separation or Chinese walls, there is not much 
to be gained in the way of economies of scope. 
 
Inter-sectoral competition, alongside already vigorous intra-sectoral competition, 
is what makes asset management one of the most competitive areas of financial 
intermediation, even in the presence of rapid growth in the size of the market for asset 
management services. Certainly the dynamics of competition for the growing pools of 
defined benefit and defined contribution pension assets in various parts of the world, 
and its cross-linkage to the mutual fund business, has led to various strategic initiatives 
among fund managers. These include mergers, acquisitions and strategic alliances 
among fund managers as well as between fund managers, commercial and universal 
banks, securities broker-dealers, and insurance companies. 
 
Market valuations of asset management companies have traditionally been quite 
high in comparison with other types of firms in the financial services industry, and this 
has been reflected in prices paid in M&A transactions. Besides gaining access to 
distribution and fund management expertise, the underlying economics of this deal-flow 
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presumably have to do with the realization of economies of scale and economies of 
scope, making possible both cost reductions and cross-selling of multiple types of 
funds, banking and/or insurance services, investment advice, high-quality research, etc. 
in a one-stop-shopping interface for investors despite a good deal of evidence that 
investors are quite happy to shop on their own with low-cost fund managers. Empirical 
evidence of either economies of scale or economies of scope in this sector is lacking, 
although the plausibility of scale economies exceed that for scope economies. In any 
event, there has been little evidence so far that M&A activity in this sector has led to 
lower fees and charges to retail investors.20 
 
In the private banking sector competition is also likely to intensify. Some will be 
offering very sophisticated products and perhaps lower costs than established private 
banks. Some will be offering innovative mutual funds or shares in limited partnerships, 
hedge funds, private equity investments or other special situations. Certainly there will 
be a profusion of both services and those offering them. Among the key competitive 
attributes of the leading asset management firms will significant distribution in leading 
markets,  product breadth and consistency, global money management expertise, 
capital strength, technology investment capability and skills, marketing and customer 
service skills, low price and low-cost production, strong global brands, a strong client-
oriented culture, cohesive senior management, and of course talented, motivated staff 
 
 Moreover, the field of competitive struggle will be in marketing just as much as it 
is in product development and investment performance. Such competition is bound to 
lower fees and commissions for private-client asset management, and the inherent 
strength of local financial firms’ control over their high net worth clients will be tested.  
 
 
Asset Management and Capital Market Development 
 
                                                 
20 See Ingo Walter, Mergers and Acquisitions in Banking and Finance (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004). 
The impact of the evolution of the asset management industry on Asian financial 
markets is likely to run the gamut from the composition of financial assets and the scope 
available for portfolio diversification to competition among financial centers as well as, 
importantly, transparency and corporate governance. 
 
With perhaps three times the proportion of financial assets on the books of banks 
and other financial intermediaries – as compared with asset managers - than the United 
States, Asia will nevertheless go through much the same process of financial 
disintermediation that characterized the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, in the 
process reducing transactions and information costs (both heavily driven by technology) 
and making available new products to end-investors. This includes a range of financial 
instruments that are broadly available elsewhere in the world but that have been unable 
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to reach critical-mass needed for trading efficiency and liquidity in some parts of Asia. 
Creation of efficient and resilient capital markets in emerging market countries 
generally, and Asia specifically, requires: 
 
• Macroeconomic stabilization, a political commitment to market solutions, the 
existence of a viable banking system, and a basic law of property. 
 
• Essential Legal Infrastructure, including basic principles of securities law, the 
concept of fiduciary responsibility, truth in new issues and effective due diligence, 
resistance to market manipulation including insider dealing and front running – 
i.e., the customer comes first. 
 
• A powerful and effective securities agency that combines independence, 
adequate enforcement powers with appropriate staffing and budgetary authority. 
 
• A sensible tax basis of companies, including dividend and capital gains taxation, 
and efforts to undercut parallel financial markets. 
 
• Essential governance infrastructure including a proper chartered accounting 
profession, sensible company law, identification of the proper role of boards of 
directors and their committees, ownership and shareholding structures, 
specification of voting rights and techniques of dispute settlement. 
 
• Creation of appropriate financial instruments. At its core are sovereign bills and 
notes in various maturities, but beyond that non-sovereign fixed-income 
instruments must be launched alongside equities. This includes commercial 
paper issues and bonds of business enterprises, recapitalization of SOE debt,  
and debt issues of municipalities, all of which imply the establishment of  
independent debt rating agencies. 
 
• On the equity side, creation of stocks as an asset class requires meaningful 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises, spinoffs and divestitures. IPOs of family-
controlled businesses and IPOs of start-ups. Usually privatizations are key to the 
development of viable equity markets as long as the resulting firms are 
competitively self-standing and independent of political interference. 
 
• Emergence of a professional broker-dealer industry, including capital adequacy 
rules, management certification (fitness and properness), employee certification, 
terms for joint ventures with foreign firms and the role of securities activities in 
banks and universal banking. This also includes the creation of stock (and 
possibly bond) exchanges with appropriate trading techniques, price discovery, 
clearance and settlement infrastructure, and custody arrangements. And there 
must be viable policies toward foreign investors, including dependable decisions 
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regarding any ownership limits, funds-only policies, differential share classes, 
and the like. 
 
• Development of institutional investors, including mutual funds, pension funds, 
special-purpose funds, bank debt and equity portfolios, insurance company debt 
and equity portfolios, and specification of the role of core shareholding and 
corporate interlocks. 
 
All of this institution-building requires a deliberate process that depends critically on 
the time schedule for implementation, training people for financial sector employment, 
building industry support infrastructures. adoption of accounting standards, developing 
an accounting profession, building competence in corporate and securities law, creating 
dispute settlement and arbitration processes and (perhaps not least) encouraging the 
use of the English language. The process is much like completing a complex 
architectural project, with careful scheduling and sequencing as important as the design 
components themselves. 
 
 
Impact on Financial Market Competition 
 
Given their size and the performance pressures bearing on them, institutional 
asset managers try to focus their trading on financial markets that are marked by the 
following characteristics: 
 
! A high degree of liquidity, notably for block trades, and good after-hours 
capabilities. 
 
! Low transactions costs, notably for commissions and spreads, clearance and 
settlement services, back-office operations, custody services, 
telecommunications and other financial infrastructure services. 
 
! High levels of transparency in securities transactions and in the securities 
themselves, including strong regulatory and enforcement capabilities to ensure 
honest dealing and a level playing field. 
 
! A broad product range of underlying securities and derivatives, and strong 
innovative capabilities. 
 
! A uniform accounting and legal infrastructure that meets global standards. 
 
! A major equities component of capital markets (of key interest to both pension 
funds and mutual funds), running from large-cap global companies to IPOs and 
private equity, with strong turnover and deep investor participation. 
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The Asian countries today maintain highly fragmented systems of fixed-income, 
stock and derivatives markets, among which only Hong Kong and Singapore come 
close to meeting the needs of major institutional asset managers and their probable 
future evolution. In the presence of electronic links and low-cost transactions services to 
institutional investors, this fragmentation should disappear over time  Certainly, the 
battle among Asian financial markets will be heavily affected by the behavior of highly 
performance-oriented asset managers. One would expect their selection of trading 
venues to gradually promote a shakeout among competing markets based on how they 
meet the aforementioned criteria. 
 
It is worthwhile noting that the large, integrated US financial market supports only 
one major equity exchange, and one major OTC trading system, alongside a number of 
specialist exchanges plus various electronic exchanges. The U.S. "equilibrium" market 
structure may represent an inappropriate indicator for a future Asian financial market 
structure supporting the rapidly growing needs of institutional asset managers, although 
the dynamics do suggest that a reasonably coherent market mosaic will eventually 
develop. For example: (1) A single wholesale market for transactions-execution; (2) 
Dispersed asset management centers and perhaps no identifiable centers at all in a 
business where the necessary information, interpretation and transactions services can 
all be delivered electronically and in real-time; and (3) Specialist centers focusing on 
particular financial instruments that have their roots in history or ongoing economic 
developments. 
 
 
Institutional Asset Managers and Corporate Governance 
 
Assuming the progressive advance in prominence of institutional asset managers 
follows along the lines suggested in this paper, the capital markets will increasingly be 
the major source of external financing for Asian companies in the future - as against the 
traditional, heavy reliance on bank finance for debt and bank and corporate long-term 
shareholdings for equity. Fiduciary asset pools managed against performance 
benchmarks by mutual funds and pension funds will create increasingly fluid sources of 
capital for industry, and a fundamental shift should develop in the accountability of 
management and monitoring of corporate performance in Asia.  In such a system, 
industrial restructuring will increasingly be triggered by the emergence of a control 
premium between the existing share price of a corporation and the value that an 
unaffiliated acquirer (whether an industrial company or an active financial investor) 
perceives could be unlocked by changes in management strategies or policies. 
Institutional asset managers often play a critical role in such scenarios. They may agree 
that a control premium does indeed exist and themselves begin purchasing shares, 
thereby placing still greater pressure on management of the target company.21 
                                                 
     21 For a comparison between traditional market-based and institution-based approaches to corporate 
control, see Jonathan Story and Ingo Walter, The Politics of European Financial Integration (Manchester: 
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Manchester University Press, and Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). See also Roy C. Smith and Ingo Walter, 
Governing the Modern Corporation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
Even in the absence of a potential acquirer putting the company in play, major 
institutional asset managers who, because of their size or portfolio constraints, find it 
difficult or impossible to dispose of their ownership interest in a company they feel is 
performing poorly can request a meeting with management about the firm's strategy, 
financial performance, and realization of shareholder value, and perhaps speak-out at 
annual general meetings. Concerns about unwanted takeover efforts and institutional 
investor dissatisfaction may in turn prompt management to undertake a self-
restructuring, seek an acceptable merger partner (white knight), pay-out special 
dividends or initiate share repurchases, or find other ways to enhance shareholder 
value and efficiency in the use of capital to preclude the emergence of a control 
premium and hostile action. 
 
The assessment of selected Asian countries with respect to the key governance 
variables related to disclosure and transparency in Exhibit 39 shows most at the bottom 
end of the ranking, suggesting poor governance practices overall, as depicted in 
Exhibits 40 and 41. A transition from the traditional corporate governance process in 
many of the Asian countries with non-independent boards and large, friendly ownership 
positions – often linked to family holdings – which insulate management from the 
pressure of external shareholders seeking improved total returns to a more 
"contestable" model is an important possible consequence of the growing role of 
professionally managed asset pools. The potential benefits of such developments 
involve reduced cost-of-capital through higher share prices and improved access to 
global financial markets and a greater capacity for restructuring national economies in 
response to changes in technology, market competition and other fundamentals. 
 
An Asian transition to an investor-driven, market-based capital-allocation process 
will require much higher levels of transparency in corporate accounting and disclosure 
than has been the norm in most countries, together with greater reliance on public 
information provided by management and systemic surveillance by research analysts 
working aggressively on behalf of investors. It implies arm's length financing on 
commercially viable terms by banks and financial markets, with financial institutions 
active in giving strategic and financial advice and sometimes taking transitional, non-
permanent equity positions in (and occasionally control of) corporations in the process 
of restructuring. 
 
It also assumes that the principal stakeholders in corporations (shareholders, 
employees, managers and customers) accept that the central claim to legitimacy of free, 
investor-driven capital markets is that they generally provide the most efficient way of 
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augmenting economic wealth, as against less viable politically-driven allocation of 
capital. This approach assumes that government will not prove a light touch for 
corporate lobbies seeking to avoid restructurings or takeovers through access to the 
public purse as a less demanding and less disciplined source of capital. The labor 
market likewise needs to be supportive, so that work-forces can be adapted and 
reallocated both functionally and geographically with the minimum of friction. 
 
To the extent that the growth of large, properly regulated and increasingly 
performance-oriented pools of managed assets grow disproportionately as part of the 
Asian financial landscape, the implications for corporate governance and economic 
restructuring is likely to be inescapable. 
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
The focus of this paper has been the structure, conduct and performance of the 
asset management industry, with special reference its evolution in the context of the 
Asian economies. The industry was positioned in a domestic and global flow-of-funds 
framework as "collective investment vehicles," with emphasis on its three principal 
components - mutual funds and hedge funds, pension funds and assets under 
management for high net-worth individuals - and their interlinkages. Evolution of the 
three asset management domains were then linked to the development of Asian capital 
markets and the process of corporate governance and economic restructuring. Several 
conclusions can be drawn. 
 
First, the asset management industry in Asia is likely to grow substantially in the 
years ahead. Institutionalization and professional management of household 
discretionary assets through mutual funds has probably run its course for the time being 
in terms of market share some countries but has barely begun in many of the Asian 
countries that have traditionally been dominated by bank assets. Demographic and 
structural problems in national pension systems will require strong growth in dedicated 
financial asset pools as pay-as-you-go systems become increasingly unsupportable 
fiscally, and alternative means of addressing the problem show themselves to be 
politically difficult or impossible to implement as a matter of global concern. There are, 
however, substantial differences of view as to the timing of these developments within 
national environments, since pension reform is politically difficult to carry out and the 
political willingness to do so is difficult to predict. In both mutual funds and pension 
funds, and their linkage through participant-influenced defined contribution pension 
schemes, the center of global growth is likely to be highly intense in the near-term in 
Western Europe and then shift to Asia in the medium term. 
 
Second, proliferation of asset management products will no doubt increase in 
Asia as financial markets become more fully integrated. Among Asian asset managers, 
there will no doubt be a great deal of jockeying for competitive position and in some 
cases changing levels of concentration, especially in the fast-growing pension fund 
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sector, as new players are allowed to enter. There may also be consolidation in some 
markets  in view of the importance of economies of scale in fund management and fund 
distribution. However, as in the United States the role of fund supermarkets, low-cost 
distribution via the Internet, as well as a large contingent of universal banks, insurance 
companies and foreign fund management companies is likely to prevent market 
structure from becoming monopolistic to any significant degree. Fund performance is 
likely become a commodity in some markets, with few differences among the major 
players and the majority of actively managed funds underperforming the indexes. This 
implies a competitive playing field that will be heavily conditioned by branding, 
advertising and distribution channels. 
 
Third, despite the prospects for rapid growth the asset management industry 
in Asia is likely to be increasingly competitive. In addition to normal commercial 
rivalry among established local players in each country, the larger markets should 
be aggressively targeted by foreign suppliers of asset management services. 
Natural barriers to entry in the asset management industry - which include the 
need for capital investment in infrastructure (especially in distribution and back-
office functions), human resources (especially in portfolio management), 
technology, and the realization of economies of scale and scope - are not 
excessively difficult for newcomers to surmount. So the degree of internal, external 
and inter-sectoral competition in this industry is likely to promote market efficiency 
for the benefit of the end-users in managing discretionary household asserts, 
pension funds, the wealth of high net-worth individuals, and other types of asset 
pools. 
 
Fourth, the evolution of the Asian institutional asset management industry 
will have a major impact on financial markets. The needs of highly performance-
oriented institutional investors will accelerate the triage among competing debt and 
equity markets in favor of those that can best meet their evolving requirements for 
liquidity, execution efficiency, transparency, and efficient regulation. In turn, this will 
influence where firms and public entities choose to issue and trade securities in 
their search for cost-effective financing and execution. At the same time, the 
growing presence of institutional investors will increase the degree of liquidity due 
to their active trading patterns, create a ready market for new classes of securities,  
and enhance opportunities for the sales and trading activities of banks and 
securities firms, and for the role of product development and research in providing 
useful investment ideas. 
 
Fifth, cross-border asset allocation will grow disproportionately as a product 
of institutional investors’ search for efficient portfolios through international portfolio 
diversification (IPD). This is inherently a global process, so that the gains will 
depend on intermarket correlations of interest rates, exchange rates, equity-
markets and other asset classes worldwide. 
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Sixth, the development of a deeper and broader capital market in Asia, 
spurred by the development of the institutional asset management industry, will 
have a bearing on the market for corporate control in some of the Asian economies 
- into a much more fluid one focused on financial performance and shareholder 
value. This should facilitate economic restructuring and creating industries that are 
encouraged to  disengage from uncompetitive activities through the denial of 
capital and at the same time promoting leading-edge industries though venture 
capital and other forms of start-up financing. Such a transformation will hardly be 
painless, and will depend critically on political will and public support for a more 
market-driven growth process. 
 
 Finally, developments in institutional asset management will pose strategic 
challenges for the management of financial institutions in extracting maximum 
competitive advantage from this high-growth sector, in structuring and motivating 
their organizations, and in managing the conflicts of interest and professional 
conduct problems that can arise in asset management and can easily cause major 
problems for the value of an institution’s competitive franchise. The fact that 
institutional asset management requires a global perspective, both on the buy-side 
and on the sell-side, reinforces the need to achieve a correspondingly global 
market positioning for a few major financial institutions, although technology and 
the changing economics of distribution virtually assures the survival of a healthy 
cohort of asset management boutiques and specialists. 
 
In quantitative terms the effects of professional asset management on the 
buy-side of the fixed income market certainly dominates its overall impacts. Fixed 
income securities – extending across the maturity spectrum from commercial paper 
to long-term bonds and across the credit spectrum from the highest investment 
grades to junk - represent the closest alternative to financial intermediation via the 
banking system. And because fixed-income instruments are marked to market 
(unlike bank loans) the emergence of broad and liquid bond markets in developing 
countries contributes transparency, liquidity, improved monitoring and market 
discipline not otherwise possible. They also represent the “second channel” of 
financial intermediation which allows greater robustness and systemic protection 
for financial systems that have frequently been derailed by banking crises. 
Accordingly, the rise of fixed-income markets in Asia from 4.3% of GDP in 1997 to 
7.1% in 2005 (albeit with high inter-country variance)22 is an encouraging 
development that has required commensurate creation and growth of 
professionally managed fixed-income portfolios. 
 
There remain a number of limitations to the contributions of asset 
management to the development of capital markets in Asia: (1) The scarcity of 
corporate bond issues, often limited to a few large companies, which needs to be 
extended through the credit spectrum to more risky, medium-size issuers with 
                                                 
22 International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2005). 
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“investibility” limited by poor investor protection and bankruptcy laws, disclosure 
and corporate governance, all of which are critical in meeting the needs of 
fiduciaries; (2) Government restrictions on corporate securities issues and control 
of the “calendar,” in effect rationing capital market access and limiting supply; (3) 
Securities issuing costs, including credit rating costs, registration and underwriting 
fees, taxes and time requirements in bringing issues to market; (4) Lack of 
secondary market liquidity, with large bid-offered spreads, small issue sizes and 
occasional one-sided markets associated with bunching of asset-holdings in the 
hands of a small number of institutional investors; (5) Limited availability of trading 
data, limiting price discovery and ability to mark portfolios to market; (6) Absence of 
hedging vehicles and derivatives markets, limiting the ability for institutional 
investors to hedge and constraining interest in the underlying securities. 
Addressing each of these limitations will be key to the contribution of institutional 
asset management to efficiency and growth in Asia going forward. 
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Source: Securities Commission Annual Report 2004
 
Exhibit 14
Asset Allocation in Malaysia
Source: Securities Commission Annual Report 2004
 
 72
 
Exhibit 15
Thailand Mutual Funds
Net Asset Value (USD bn)
2,709.92 2,988.80
4,313.45
7,418.83
8,783.70
10,123.76
278.06 227.11 206.48
3,580.06
4,073.52 4,476.04
-
2,000.00
4,000.00
6,000.00
8,000.00
10,000.00
12,000.00
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Q3. 2005
Open-end Funds Closed-end Funds
Source : Investment Management Supervision Department, SEC, Thailand
 
Exhibit 16
Types of Funds, Korea
Equity Hybrid Bond MMF Others
2000 4062 46389 56225 26805 0
2001 6623 41566 63977 35402 0
2002 9319 45218 60031 49482 0
2003 8316 32075 52658 42052 0
2004 7454 30703 74583 59801 7762
2005.11 20422 34460 50794 67271 18238
Equity Hybrid Bond Others
2000 13 4786 15 0
2001 296 6982 190 0
2002 1164 7399 1561 0
2003 1085 7115 1736 0
2004 1097 3849 1304 438
2005.11 1946 7505 729 559
Corporate Type
Source:  AMAK
 
 73
 
Exhibit 17
Investment of Funds by Instruments – Singapore 
Source:  2004 Singapore Asset Management Survey
 
Exhibit 18
Asset Allocation of Mutual Funds in Asia – Summary
Dominate
Dominate
Dominate
Dominate
Significant
Bond
Significant
Significant
Significant
Dominate
Dominate
Money MarketEquity
DominateSingapore
Thailand
Philippines
DominateMalaysia
Korea
Indonesia
China
 
 74
 
Exhibit 19
Internationalization of Mutual Funds in Asia
Up to USD 200mm per yearThailand
No restrictions
Up to 20 percent
Prior approval from the central 
bank
Up to 30 percent
No restrictions 
Less than 15 percent of the 
NAV
Investment in OffshoreForeign Funds Listed  
No restrictionsSingapore
Legislation proposed to remove 
restrictions
Philippines
Subject to SC approvalMalaysia
No restrictionsKorea
Indonesia
Joint ventures (1991)
Sales to foreign companies (up to 
49%)
China
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Never/not applicable
Only when dissatisfied with
performance
On going
Every 5 years
Every 2 to 3 years
Annually
More often than once a year
Source: Financial Times, March 17, 2004
Exhibit 20
Formal Reviews of Pension Fund Managers
 
 75
 
Exhibit 21
Pension Funds in Asia
Provident Funds, Retirement Mutual 
Funds
none
Existent, but very small
Existent, information na
Employer Pension Funds, Financial 
Institution Pension Funds
Enterprise Annuity Plan 
PrivatePublic
Central Provident FundSingapore
Social Welfare Fund, 
Government Pension Fund
Thailand
Employee Provident FundMalaysia
National Pension SchemeKorea
Jamsostek, TaspenIndonesia
Social Security FundChina
 
Exhibit 22
Asset Allocation of Public Pension Funds in Asia
Dominant
Bank 
Deposits
Dominant
Dominant
Dominant
Bonds
Dominant
Dominant
Significant
Government 
Bonds
Equity
Singapore
Thailand
SignificantMalaysia
Korea
Indonesia
China
 
 76
 
Exhibit 23
Malaysia Pension Asset Allocation, 2004 vs. 1990
Source:  OECD / IOPS Conference on Private Pension in Asia
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Malaysia: Funds Outsourced to External Managers
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Source: Swiss Banking School, 2005  
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Exhibit 35
Hong Kong AUM by Asset Allocation in 2004
(HK$ million)
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Source: 2004 Survey of the Singapore Asset Management Industry
Exhibit 37
Singapore AUM Growth by Type 2000-2004
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Singapore AUM by Source, 2004
Source: Singapore MAS, 2005  
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Quality of Corporate Governance, 2004
 
